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Foreword 
 
 
Our friend and colleague Rüdiger Dornbusch passed away before he was 
able to complete his book based on the Munich Lectures in Economics that 
he gave in November 17, 1998, at the Center for Economic Studies of 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität. The lectures contain a fascinating overview 
of the mechanics and history of international financial crises showing the 
breadth and ingenuity of this eminent scholar. The lectures were lively and 
provocative, full of important insights and observations. Interestingly 
enough, Dornbusch expressed a substantial mistrust in the actions of political 
decision makers, supervisory agencies and central banks in the game that 
leads to the crisis and even collapse of financial systems, and he advocated 
supranational supervisory actions as a remedy.  
CES has decided to prepare a transcript of the lectures, which are also 
available in the Internet as full length-videos. I am grateful to Paul Kremmel 
for his assistance.  
 
Munich, March 2003  
 
 
Hans-Werner Sinn 
Ifo Institute 
Poschingerstrasse 5 
81679 Munich 
Germany 
sinn@ifo.de 
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These remarks were prepared to introduce Rudiger Dornbusch's Munich Lectures in 
Economics, at the Center for Economic Studies, Ludwig-Maximilians University, Munich, 
on November 17, 1998. 
 
 
LAUDATIO: RUDIGER DORNBUSCH 
 
Stanley Fischer 
 
 
 
It is an honor for me to introduce this year's Distinguished CES Fellow who is to deliver 
the Munich Lectures in Economics, Professor Rudiger Dornbusch; it is an enormous 
pleasure for me to introduce to you a superb economist, an outstanding speaker, a 
remarkable person, my co-author, and my friend for nearly thirty years, Rudi 
Dornbusch. 
 
I would like to tell you about four aspects of Rudi: the young scholar; the policy 
economist and polemicist; the teacher; and the human being. 
 
 
The young scholar 
 
I first met Rudi Dornbusch at the University of Chicago in the autumn of 1969. I was a 
freshly minted Ph.D. from MIT, and he was one of an outstanding group of graduate 
students, among them Jacob Frenkel and Michael Mussa. They were students of Harry 
Johnson and Robert Mundell, in Milton Friedman's Chicago. Some, among them 
especially Rudi and Jacob Frenkel, honored the great Lloyd Metzler, who was still at 
Chicago.  
 
It must have been a wonderful place and time to be a graduate student in international 
macroeconomics, not only because of the world-famous faculty, even more because of 
the synergy among outstanding students.  
 
Somehow I found myself on Rudi's thesis committee, a very junior third to Mundell and 
Johnson. At the time I valued mathematical virtuosity more than I should have. But I 
looked at Rudi's thesis, "A Monetary Theory of Currency Depreciation" again last 
week, and realized how excellent it is, displaying a mind so clear and expositional talents 
so formidable that it can have been written only by a young master. It is also obviously 
the work of a student of Robert Mundell's -- and Rudi was most of all a Mundell 
student. I know that because I was there. But if you should doubt it, look at the beautiful 
series of papers Mundell produced from the late 1950s to the mid 1960s, reprinted in his 
1965 classic book, Monetary Theory, and see how similar is the elegance and clarity of 
style, exposition, and thought in the classic papers Rudi wrote in the 1970s.   
 
That was the young Rudi Dornbusch: the scholar who left Chicago for Rochester, where 
he spent two years, before returning to Chicago to teach at the Business School; the 
teacher whose notes for his business school students later provided the basis of the 
aggregate demand and supply apparatus in the Dornbusch-Fischer textbook; the scholar 
who wrote a series of path-breaking papers, several of which later appeared in his 
classic book, Open-Economy Macroeconomics.   4
 
I left Chicago to return to MIT at the same time as Rudi returned to join the Chicago 
Business School faculty in 1973. But when in 1975, MIT needed an international macro-
economist, it did not take very much to persuade my senior colleagues that he was the 
person we wanted. So Rudi came to MIT. It was MIT's good fortune; it was certainly my 
good fortune; and it was also Rudi's, for he needed to move on to another intellectual 
environment – albeit, an environment that at the beginning, he did not like. But within a 
short time of arriving he had written his classic overshooting article, he was soon 
recognized as an outstanding classroom teacher and thesis adviser, and he soon became 
central to the MIT Department of Economics.  
 
And for the next decade, he continued to produce outstanding theoretical articles, at the 
same time as his interest in policy issues grew. Some of the best articles of that period 
are collected in Exchange Rates and Inflation (1988). One of my favorites in that book is 
his paper on the problem of disinflation, "Inflation Stabilization and Capital Mobility", 
a paper whose relevance to the problems confronting countries trying to stabilize from 
high inflation using an exchange rate anchor has grown over the years. 
 
 
The policy economist 
 
In the introduction to Exchange Rates and Inflation, written in 1988, Rudi explained:  
 
Over time my interests, and some beliefs, have changed very much. As a student, 
and early in my career, models and results were exciting, and there could not be 
enough of it. Today my interest is mostly in policy and policy-oriented research. 
The difference is subtle: in modeling, the main interest is in the structure and the 
implications; in policy-oriented research, by contrast, the central issue is to 
capture a problem, even if one does not write down the whole maximization 
problem. That is a weakness of the policy approach, and it might even be enough 
to reject it altogether. I do not think so. On the contrary, there is a broad 
complementarity between modeling and identifying and 'painting' issues. 
 
I am not sure this characterization of the difference between modeling and policy work 
is entirely right, for the problem in both cases is to capture the essence of a complicated 
situation in a tractable and relevant form. But no doubt there is more latitude for 
pursuing the logically more interesting and empirically less relevant angles in modeling 
than in policy analysis. 
 
Rudi is one of the outstanding policy economists of our time. He has worked on a range 
of applied problems, typically the major international and national economic issues of 
the day, but also -- as in his exceptionally interesting work on hyperinflation -- on the 
most interesting parts of economic history. But even when he is working on economic 
history, he is thinking about policy issues, for instance in applying the lessons of the 
dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to the breakup of the Soviet bloc. Among 
his policy papers, the most famous may well be the Brookings paper predicting the 
Mexican peso crisis, but that is only one of many papers on the economic problems of 
Latin American countries. Another that repays rereading is his 1990 paper with 
Sebastian Edwards, "Macroeconomic Populism", which accurately depicts a temptation 
to which policymakers in Latin America and other countries used often to succumb, and 
no doubt sometimes will succumb in future.  5
 
Although Rudi describes himself as having shifted to working on policy issues by 1988, 
the change was gradual, and analytic articles -- albeit on more clearly policy-related 
issues than before -- continued to appear in the 1980s and into the 1990s. 
 
In his more popular articles, in his columns, and sometimes on the podium -- where his 
wit and the speed of his mind make him an exciting and formidable presence, Rudi is 
one of the finest polemicists in the profession. He seems to take as his leitmotif a 
statement of Keynes "Words ought to be a little wild for they are the assault of thoughts 
on the unthinking” – and no one could accuse him of not erring on the wild side. 
 
You may wonder how anyone can write as much as Rudi does. The technique is simple -- 
it is to stop agonizing and start writing. Rudi will make three or four bullet points on the 
page, typically in the midst of a mess of doodles, and then start writing. His first drafts 
are just that, drafts to be improved. The technique works.  
 
 
The teacher 
 
Rudi is a spectacularly successful teacher, in the classroom, in supervising theses, and 
through his textbooks. In the classroom the secret of his success is careful preparation: 
in earlier years, the well-developed lecture notes that he handed out, more recently, the 
shorter notes summarizing the models and facts that are to be the subject of the lecture. 
As his interests have shifted to policy, he has also shifted to teaching in the Sloan School. 
Business School students are known to be excessively demanding, but by all accounts 
Rudi's courses in the Sloan School are regularly sold out. 
 
As a thesis adviser, Rudi has had few peers. Every outstanding international 
macroeconomist who has been to MIT -- and many of them have -- including Jeff 
Frankel, Paul Krugman, Maury Obstfeld and Ken Rogoff is a Rudi student, and so are 
most of the best macroeconomists who were at MIT. There are outstanding Rudi 
students all over the globe: the Italians, among them Mario Drahi, Francesco Giavazzi, 
and Alberto Giovanni; Pedro Aspe in Mexico; and Andre Lara Resende in Brazil; and 
many more. While they all acknowledge their debts to Rudi, it is not necessarily the best 
economists who have benefitted most from working with him, for they would have been 
outstanding anyway. Rather it is the legion of students, many of them from abroad, who 
have been part of Rudi's schule, the group that meets weekly at 8 a.m. to discuss their 
theses, who reflect what his intellectual generosity has meant for generations of MIT 
students. He has students who are devoted to him all over Latin America, and in much 
of the rest of the world. In the richly deserved devotion of this legion of students to their 
teacher and friend lies the greatest compliment to his teaching and mentoring.  
 
 
I have had the good fortune to collaborate with Rudi in the writing of two textbooks. 
One of them Macroeconomics, has given me as much satisfaction as anything else I have 
done in my scholarly life. The book has sold well over a million copies worldwide, and 
we can justly feel that we have contributed to educating the readers, many of them in 
developing countries. Few things are as pleasant as to encounter a student who says that 
he or she used our book, and even better, that they remember something in it. We have 
both had that experience all over the world, from Sweden and Russia in the North, all 
the way to Tasmania, Chile and South Africa in the South -- and I thank Rudi for  6
having made that possible. However not all encounters with students are totally 
encouraging: in one country I saw a group of students with copies of Dornbusch and 
Fischer in hand, standing shyly at the back of a group of officials, with whom I was 
talking, so walked over to chat with them. One of them said, "Professor, thank you, this 
is such an excellent book. But please sir, could you recommend an easier one?" 
 
 
Rudi 
 
Finally, let me salute the exceptional person who you will hear tonight. Rudi is among 
the most talented of men, and among the warmest, the most generous, with his time and 
himself, available for his students and his friends whenever they need him. My life is far 
richer for having had the good fortune to meet Rudi, and to have him as a friend. 
 
That is why it is such a pleasure for me to be able to introduce to you, Rudi Dornbusch. 
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Transcript of Rudi Dornbusch’s Munich Lectures 
 
DAY ONE 
  
It’s a great privilege to be here. It’s wonderful to be introduced by Stan Fischer who was 
generous enough to interrupt saving the world to be here. When I saw him to my own 
surprise today here, I knew there was a crisis. It had to be the Sinn Krise. Let me assure 
you that the IMF has enough money to solve any problem that local authorities cannot 
deal with. 
 
This is not the first time that I’m at Munich University. Forty years ago, when my 
brother was a student here I was here once early in the morning. I’m afraid the reason 
was that it was raining outside, and the Hofbrauhaus wasn’t open yet. It’s a great 
privilege to be back under more distinguished circumstances, and I’m very much 
honoured by the privilege of being the CES Fellow of this year, the invitation to be here, 
and the very, very distinguished audience that has come.  
 
I have decided to talk about international financial crises. I decided a year ago with a 
great confidence that they would still be there and that the answers would remain to be 
found. Let me give you a preliminary report of what is going on. Of course, listening to 
an economist is a problem for anyone, but remember that economists are people who 
are good with numbers but lack the charisma to be accountants. My discussion will 
centre on the difference between old style financial crises that we had perhaps up to the 
’80s and the new kind that we see today. And that is a distinction between the slow 
motion crises of the past, where things were going in the wrong direction and in the end 
would not end well, but slow motion sufficiently so that mid-course correction could 
avoid the crisis, and even if the crisis happened, it was a very strictly local event and 
mostly interesting for the governing finance minister, but not a dramatic setback, even 
for the country, less for the region, and surely for the world.  
 
By contrast, the new kind of crisis is dramatic, it happens in fast motion, it’s far away 
from local, it’s ascribed to the world financial system, and it ends not only with the 
finance minister going overboard, but much of the country too. And I think it’s 
important to ask where is that difference, and how do we have to rethink the 
international financial system and national economic management to recognise those 
new factors.  
 
The new factors surely are not the speculators. The picture of a world economy where 
five hedge funds in New York have lunch to decide whom they will attack next, only 
then to overthrow a poor and unsuspecting country that has saved hard for decades, 
worked hard for decades, but is suddenly declared the victim, surely can’t be the right 
view. Perhaps the story is well told, why it isn’t the right view, of a poor Christian who 
was thrown to the lions and the man was very, very afraid of what was to come and he 
stared at the big lion and he fell on his knees to pray to the lord and he said, “Lord, 
please make this happen fast and without much pain.” And as he looks at the lion, he 
notes the lion is also on his knees. And he says, “Mister Lion, Sir. I am praying because 
this is very, very bad. But why, Mister Lion, Sir, are you praying?” And the lion said, 
“I’m not praying, I’m saying grace.” That is surely not what international financial 
crises are about.  
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We have to dig a little bit deeper and we have to remember it wasn’t just George Soros, 
it was the Vatican, and probably Muenchner Rueck also. Where would we look for the 
difference? The side issues of excess capacity in the world economy, low commodity 
prices – all of that is not going to give us a world financial crisis. Where should we look? 
The answer surely is that capital movements today are the central issues. Capital 
movements badly used are an extraordinary risk factor, and that the rest are interesting 
and complicating factors.  
 
The view of the old crises is that they happened without much capital mobility. That 
perhaps there was some World Bank money. Perhaps they were some bank loans. But 
that was mostly a side issue. There was a government that had some reserves and some 
World Bank funds to supplement and it had some bad policies: budget deficits, 
overvalued currency leading to current account deficits which in turn led to a steady loss 
of reserves, and anything that is steadily being depleted, in the end, is going to be gone, 
and everybody could foresee that in half a year or a year, the reserves on the current 
course of events would be gone, and when the reserves were gone, then policy would 
have to change.  
 
Of course that movement of transition would be very painful and because the pain was 
so acute, one would try and avoid it, and the way to avoid it would be to put tariffs and 
quotas and to restrict imports and to try and subsidise exports and to pursue a whole 
range of bad policies only to push off the day of reckoning, but without much success. 
And in the end there was a day of reckoning, which would lead to a 15 per cent 
devaluation, which would lead the minister of finance to fall from office, and then life 
would start all over again, at the beginning with great joy, because the devaluation had 
produced a gain in competitiveness which allowed an expansion of the economy, and 
then in the second chapter, one would do the same thing again. And those were very 
predictable things, and they were deeply uninteresting to the international financial 
system and they surely wouldn’t have warranted an article on the front page of the 
Financial Times.  
 
Nothing could be more different from what is happening now where suddenly in the 
afternoon of an otherwise sunny day, the world financial system wants 50 billion dollars 
from a country, and the country doesn’t have the 50 billion dollars, and the IMF cannot 
get there fast enough, and the next thing, the place blows up, and there is a massive 
depreciation of the currency, pervasive bankruptcy, and the fire spreads to the next 
country. And one after the other, until all of Asia is gone, and then Russia, and then 
Brazil and who knows what comes next. Dramatically different in all its characteristics, 
and dramatically different in the implications for the world economy and for everybody 
anywhere.  
 
Crises are now different in that they involve very large amounts of very short-term 
money. That is one aspect. Second, that the economy is highly leveraged around that 
money, so that when something happens, the whole house of cards collapses. And 
thirdly, the world economy is deeply global, through the financial structures and that 
means that when something happens anywhere, it happens everywhere. So that of 
course makes international financial crises today something really interesting.  
 
There is a second question of a distinction, whether emerging market crises are very, 
very different than those that happen in rich countries. The ’92 events of Europe, are 
they deeply different from what happened in Asia? In some respects, they aren’t deeply  9
different. When Italy comes under attack, everybody can figure out that England is 
next. And when Italy goes, everybody knows that England is gone. And if you look at 
Scandinavia, much of the same problems that you see in emerging markets are clearly 
present. There is a difference of degree, that in emerging markets, the extent of 
mismanagement in every aspect of finance and politics, it’s very, very pervasive, and 
therefore, the blow-up is bigger. Whereas in Britain, the exchange rate crisis is in some 
way a sideshow because the rest is pretty clean. And the same could be said even of Italy. 
So I believe there it’s a difference of degree, and it is interesting to ask where is it, but it 
isn’t a totally different kind of crisis to the one that Scandinavia, Britain and Italy 
suffered in 1992, with its aspects of contagion, with its aspect unsustainable exchange 
rate regimes, and what we’ve seen in Asia and are still witnessing in Russia, or Latin 
America.  
 
So let me focus on these new financial crises and ask where do they come from? And I 
want to ask where do these crises come from in a deep way. And the answer is going to 
be a vulnerability of balance sheets, and then I want to ask what are the post-mortems of 
the crises? What are interesting little details of how those countries sank and the 
emphasis there is on the profound mismanagement of the monetary authorities. And 
then I want to ask what are the unresolved questions of research around these crises, 
and those are the timing. It’s very easy to predict a crisis, but then you have to wait for 
two years until it happens. There is the issue of contamination. Why innocent bystanders 
get hit. And there is the last issue of the depth of crisis. Why are they so traumatic, 
leaving a crater that is unbelievably deep? Where should we look for that explanation?  
 
Then lastly, I want to ask, with that autopsy of financial crises, where should we look for 
reform? Should we go the direction of saying this is a shootout world, and if the 
speculators have big guns, then we should equip the IMF with bigger guns? Or whether 
we should look for systemic differences that are far more focusing on precaution and 
pre-emption rather than the weapons that get used in conflict and finally, at the level of 
countries, what is a good way to get out, and what is a bad way? So that is my menu for 
what lies ahead in the next few minutes.  
 
Let me take my central argument about the new financial crises. Think of a world 
characterised by a banker’s image. The banker’s image is that it’s not speed that kills; 
it’s the sudden stop. And that of course was seen in all of these countries, where money 
was happily coming at an ever-rising pace, and then suddenly it wasn’t coming. And 
when it wasn’t coming, that was the end of the story.  
 
Why is it the end of the story? The argument is that the national balance sheet is 
extremely vulnerable. You could live for years and years and years with a balance sheet 
like that, and nothing ever happens, and nobody ever talks about you, and you are a 
great story of success, with high growth and a miracle. And then something happens and 
then it turns out that that very vulnerability is such that it’s a dramatic end of all 
success.  
 
Think of drunk driving. Think of someone who has made a great expertise of drunk 
driving, regularly drives drunk, tells you that he never has a problem, and one day there 
is a terrible, terrible accident. And he’ll say, “Well, it was the red light. It wasn’t my 
being drunk. Normally that light is green.” And that is, of course, the story of Asia. 
Drunk driving, which for years has worked, with a financial structure that is recklessly,  10
recklessly unsound. But the light was green and then one day it wasn’t green, and then 
the house of cards came crumbling down.  
 
Where specifically is the problem? The problem is you could call value at risk, to use the 
modern term, the technical term for looking at balance sheets, and ask, in a bad 
scenario, what could the losses be? Value at risk comes, one, from the maturity issue. 
That the balance sheets in emerging market economies have extraordinarily short-term 
liabilities. And that means people can want to get their money back tomorrow 
afternoon, and when someone wants their money back, they all want their money back. 
And if they all want their money back, there is no way for an economy to pay at short 
notice. And if I can’t repay, then they’ll be much more eager to get their money, and as 
the bank run occurs, of course the rest of the economy will collapse with it. Maturity is 
the first issue. And this, of course, means to structure your maturities, to have relatively 
little that is short term and therefore a reasonable chance to meet to those liabilities, 
should they be called.  
 
The second issue is denomination. There is a very big risk for a country to denominate 
its liabilities in foreign exchange. Something that they cannot print, something that they 
cannot get their hands on, and therefore something that is very vulnerable if in fact the 
exchange moves, the burden of those liabilities increases and bankruptcy of the country 
and the underlying companies becomes a big issue. Because if that is seen to be 
happening, then of course, everybody wants their money before it happens, and as they 
try to get it, they provoke the very collapse that I’m describing.  
 
The third issue is balance sheets that have highly volatile substances in them. Highly 
volatile substances like foreign exchange liabilities, or stocks; their market value can 
change rapidly, and as it does, it produces insolvency. And the third issue is national 
credit risk. That a balance sheet is sensitive if not one company of one bank in a country 
comes under suspicion, but if suddenly all of them come. Then of course, for the 
country, we have not the rating of the best and not the rating of the second best, but 
suddenly everybody goes under and as a result the entire country loses access to credit, 
loses access to an ability to meet its short term commitments, and with that, it falls into 
bankruptcy. And bankruptcy that rarely happens without a collapse in asset prices on 
the inside, and the exchange rate on the outside.  
 
I’ve described the vulnerability of the balance sheet as the central issue in looking for 
the explanation of the bigtime crises. But that is not enough because we have to go 
behind the national balance sheet and ask: What could the government do in order to 
defend a precarious situation? And here, of course, comes the underlying fragility. The 
underlying fragility in a corporate structure or in a banking structure, which is such 
that the traditional means to defend a currency and the external front of a country with 
that, is to raise interest rates.  
 
But if you have a fragile corporate or banking or social structure that is intolerant of a 
loss of growth, then interest rates cannot be raised. Interest rates cannot be raised if the 
banks are weak, because then all their loans turn bad. The banking system goes belly-
up. If the corporate structure has too much leverage, think of Korea, debt-equity ratios 
of 5 to 1, 10 to 1, and more. Higher interest rates mean that companies go bankrupt 
overnight. And a social structure that is vulnerable if you lose growth, then the politics 
goes kaput, and when the politics goes kaput, the investors of course, will leave very 
rapidly.   11
 
Throughout Asia, we had that underlying fragility in the domestic economy that was 
such that interest rates could not be raised to defend the exchange rate. But if interest 
rate cannot be raised to defend exchange rates, then the slightest piece of bad news 
means capital outflows, those capital outflows quickly become punitive. If there isn’t a 
lot of reserves in the central bank, then everybody knows this is going to end with a 
currency crisis, and that currency crisis is sure because the government isn’t making it 
expensive for the speculators to bet against the currency, they can’t afford to, so it’s only 
a question of time. Anything that is only a question of time is certain to happen, and 
anytime that rumour spreads, of course, all the sharks will come: the big ones, and all 
the little ones along.  
 
So I believe we have to look one to the fragile balance sheet, the national balance sheet, 
and second, the inability to raise interest rates to defend the currency as the 
combination of facts that explains to us why it is that we get these currency crises.  
 
To look for specific examples, think of Thailand. In Thailand the banking system had 
invested in a real estate bubble that was totally glorious. It is not the first and the last 
country to do so. But the real estate bubble had matured. It was about to go. Higher 
interest rates were the one thing that the real estate bubble could not afford and 
therefore the banks could not afford.  
 
In Thailand, every bank owns a politician; every politician owns two banks. And so you 
have a wonderful harmony that the interest rate mustn’t go up. But if the interest rate 
cannot go up, then all the little things that make Thailand suddenly a little bit less 
attractive come into play and then it becomes attractive to speculate against the country 
and because the interest rate isn’t high, that doesn’t cost a lot, and anything that doesn’t 
cost a lot and promises a lot becomes a world-wide investor sport. And that’s what 
happened in Thailand. The story is the same: they couldn’t raise interest rates because 
financing companies would have had big delinquencies on all the people who had bought 
their motorcycles. If you look at the companies that couldn’t afford high interest rates 
because they had taken on huge debt burdens, and therefore even a small change in 
interest rates meant a very dramatic change in their cash flow and therefore a risk of 
bankruptcy. The country was taken hostage to the inability to defend their currency 
because the financial structure was too fragile.  
 
And we see exactly the same in every one of the Asian situations. You can’t raise the 
interest rate, because the financial structure is too fragile. Much the same was there in 
the ’92 crisis. In Britain high interest rates just wasn’t very popular. And at 15 per cent, 
to do an extra per cent just to show the speculators how serious you were was a little too 
much, and you gave up. In Sweden there was a glorious day when the central bank 
raised interest rates above 100 per cent. And everybody understood that that would not 
last three. And it didn’t last three days. So, inability to defend their currencies, because 
the interest rate produces financial distress in the banking system, in companies, or in 
politics is a central part of the story. And the more fragile the external side with short 
maturities, and the more fragile the domestic side with sensitivity to a period of high 
interest rates, the more likely that a currency crisis succeeds.  
 
Look at the little details in Thailand. The Thai government, in an attempt to bail out all 
their friends on the home front, lowered interest rates below Singapore. And that meant 
to any investor that borrowing from Thailand and investing in Singapore was a really  12
good idea. That would mean being subsidised to do just that. And to be ordinary 
economist, that’s what they did. But as the government experienced the capital outflows, 
and the pressure on the exchange rate, the central bank used its reserves to offer 
forward contracts. And that, of course, meant that you could risk-free invest in 
Singapore and be paid to do that. Which everybody proceeded to do with the central 
bank taking the counterpart on something like 30 billion dollars of forward contracts. 
And that continued until they had lost all their money. So they actually were subsiding 
the speculators to do their own brewing.  
 
In the process an important lack of transparency on what the reserves actually were and 
that, in fact, they had all disappeared made the sudden news that they weren’t there any 
more far more brutal, caused the exchange rate collapse to be more intense, forced 
everybody to rush much more rapidly to try and cover their positions, and in the 
process, drive the exchange rate even further. So I would pay a lot of attention to bad 
policy, not only in allowing a bad financial system that is intolerant of a period of high 
interest rates, but also of the defence of the exchange rate with very in-transparent 
policies batting away even the last penny of reserves, only then to be left with a big crisis 
afterwards.  
 
What I have described about Thailand is very much the same in Korea. In Korea, a 
government that has mismanaged the details of economic policy for the past 20 years 
with great success has protected the country against any kind of foreign capital inflows. 
Why? Because they wanted to protect the domestic monopolies. In an attack of insanity, 
they thought it was really good that their own that their own merchant banks should be 
allowed to borrow in Tokyo and invest in Russian and Brazilian bonds. And that’s 
where the Korean problem was made.  
 
Having invested in them, they soon found out three percent in Tokyo and 18 per cent on 
Russian bonds isn’t only what you get: that adversity can hit and suddenly what you 
hold goes down and you’re illiquid and people want their money back and you have a 
Korean national crisis which cannot be addressed because the interest rates cannot be 
raised because the entire industrial structure is fantastically leveraged with debt. 
Wherever you look the story is the same: a fragile financial system intolerant of high 
interest rates, an extremely liquid external liabilities structure, and then you’re only 
waiting for an accident. I think there is nothing deeper in it, and the central part is the 
mismanagement of finance nationally, and not the speculative attack, which is just 
taking advantage of money that is lying on the pavement and that’s what god invented 
speculators for.  
 
Let me come to the issues raised in the post-mortem. And the first is timing: Why is it so 
hard to predict a currency crisis ahead of time? I think that is not surprising after you 
decide that the deep answer is the vulnerability of the structure. If the financial 
structure is vulnerable, then yes, it could happen anytime, and it also might happen 
never. Everybody has predicted for the last 30 years that the Middle East will blow, and 
one day it will but it hasn’t happened yet. 
 
And the same is true of financial structure. Anyone who has looked at the Korean 
financial structure would have said if there’s ever a problem, it’s going to be a gigantic 
problem. Or at Indonesia, or at Thailand. Anybody who had looked at Hong Kong 
would have said, it’s going to be very hard to get a crisis here. Even if there is a heavy 
storm. If you looked at Argentina, you would say, pretty nice financial institutions. Very  13
hard to see how they go bankrupt. So I believe that the sheer fragility does not mean 
that the accident must happen. It just means the potential is there. For that reason it is 
very difficult to announce that within a short period of time, there will be a crisis.  
 
But the Thai crisis was clearly predicted because it was underway for a year. And it was 
only a question of time because it was so well understood that the government couldn’t 
raise the interest rate and without it, it couldn’t hold the exchange rate, and if the 
exchange rate went then the whole house of cards would go.  
 
But the timing in some instances is easier to pin down, surely once some pressure has 
come. We know what structures cannot bear the interest rates that are needed to defend 
it. Look at Brazil for example. Real interest rates of 30 per cent are not viable. Neither 
in the credit system nor in economic growth, and without economic growth, Brazil is not 
viable. And the same would be true of course of all of Scandinavia in the ’92 episode. So 
once it gets going, then we can really tell who is going to last long, and for that reason 
will not have a lot of adverse speculation, because simply, they can make it expensive to 
the speculators. And those who cannot last long and therefore will be the focus of 
attention. Because while it is true that the speculators lose for the moment, they 
understand that in the end the big prize will come.  
 
It is hazardous. You can predict that a Mexico will go down, but it will take two years 
before it happens. The theorem is that financial crises take much, much longer to come 
than you think and then they happen much faster than you would have thought. So you 
have a chance to be wrong twice. But any time a financial crisis has to do not just with a 
balance sheet issue, but also with a loss of growth and a seriously misaligned currency, 
then prediction becomes much easier because then you move into a situation that really 
cannot last for any length of time even with relatively good weather, then it is a question 
of a year. And that was surely the Mexican situation and that is surely the Brazilian 
situation unless now with the IMF package, an extraordinary outbreak of confidence 
changes the path of events.  
 
Let me come to the second issues of contamination. And here of course is a very, very 
important system issue: the question whether one country’s accident, whether deserved 
or not, then spreading to other countries is something that must and should be avoided 
at all costs. That there ought to be a firewall, and the system should do all and 
everything to avoid that the next one, and the next one gets drawn in. Surely that is the 
argument for the domestic monetary authorities to rescue too-large-to-fail banks to 
avoid the spread to the whole system and we have seen that argument substantially in 
Asia. That an innocent Indonesia was the victim of a tyrant which itself may or may not 
have been the victim of circumstances.  
 
But we will have to say why is it that Indonesia and Taiwan did not? And the answer, of 
course, is that in Indonesia you have fantastic short-term liabilities, with a dramatic 
domestic mismanagement of investment. And in Taiwan, by contrast, you have short-
term liabilities that are extremely small relative to the country’s reserves. And they 
could pay them all off and have ¾ of their reserves left. And that mean no accident ever 
happened. The country kept happily going on, in a region that had trouble with some 
impact on their growth, but nothing like a crisis. So the distinction between a Taiwan 
that didn’t have a crisis and everybody else that did, surely lies exactly in that number, 
how large are the short term liabilities relative to the country’s reserves – with Taiwan 
the good case, and Indonesia, for example, the bad one.   14
 
But it also has to do with the underlying banking structure. If you look at Hong Kong, 
you ask: “Why are they still there?” Because their banks are very, very sound. And if 
you ask why is Indonesia burned? Because their banks were very unsound before 
everything started, and of course, by now even more so. So I believe the contamination 
issue is not that you sit next door and therefore you get hit as you might in a firestorm, 
but that those who get hit are the ones who have exactly the same problems as the last 
one that just had an accident. That the markets focused on a set of factors where they 
learned about how a country quickly can go under and everybody who is vulnerable in 
that respect will get a visit. And if the first visit produces a disaster, who is surprised 
that there is more of it? And that explains why we should have gotten to Korea, Russia 
and Brazil. Russia and Brazil are not exactly in the neighbourhood of a Korea or a 
Taiwan.  
 
The third issue that is important to address is the sheer magnitude of a financial crisis. 
Why is it that when a small foreign exchange thing goes wrong, the next thing, the 
banking system is bankrupt, the economy goes into a recession of 5-10 per cent, the 
currency collapses by a factor of 3, 4, 5, 10, you risk being on the verge of hyperinflation, 
where just a year before, you were the model case of how to manage a 20-year growth 
experience.  
 
I think there are 3 arguments to bring for the depth of the collapse. The first one is 
again, financial structure. A banking system is a very important part of how a country 
hangs together. It may even be a country’s neural system. If the banks are directly 
involved in the problem of exchange, perhaps because they had very large dollar 
liabilities and therefore a big exchange rate move wipes out their solvency, certainly 
their ability to lend, certainly their ability to extend credit, that would be a major 
impact. That is the 1930s story of the Great Depression, and exactly the same 
mechanisms can happen very rapidly in an emerging market setting where on the 
liabilities side, very, very large, very, very short term liabilities, can in no time become a 
bankruptcy issue for an entire banking system, more so if it’s unregulated. 
 
I think the second issue here is property rights. You would believe that when you have a 
country collapse with asset prices falling to 1/10
th of what they were, and the currency 
collapses to reduce those prices even further, why is not everybody rushing in to buy 
themselves a vacation home on the finest beach of Thailand, or a wonderful estate in 
Indonesia producing palm oil. And property rights is the answer.  
 
In a country where there are no property rights, cheap means nothing. It means it’s too 
expensive. When Mexico went under, the US bond artists, the cannibal funds that go 
into distress situations, worked on the rule of thumb that 50 cents on the dollar was 
what you get in any corporate reorganisation. When the bonds failed, if it’s less than 50 
cents on the dollar, buy it because on the collateral, you make your money. And when 
the Mexican bonds went to 20 cents on the dollar, all the scavenger funds said, 
”Wonderful times lie ahead. We’re going to buy up all the Mexican debt. We’re going to 
repossess all the collateral; we’re going to make a lot of money.” And by accident, 
someone sent a lawyer to Mexico, just to get the details. And they found, yes, it takes 9 
years, but nobody ever succeeded. And that was the end of trying to repossess assets, to 
buy it at a bargain, to believe that in a financial crisis, there is real value to be gotten. 
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In Asia, very much that is the issue just as it was in Mexico. The issue is that it isn’t 
worth buying the stuff, because it isn’t going to be yours. More so if the judges are for 
sale. More so if Suharto’s family is an integral part of the bankruptcy, who believes 
you’ll depossess them. In every one of the Asian economies, property rights is a dramatic 
issue. There’s no way of assuring those. And as a result, capital is a one way street. It 
only goes out, or tries to go out, and there’s no offsetting arbitrage that comes in to say, 
“These assets are cheap, let’s take advantage”. Surely, that has an important implication 
for how to respond better to a crisis.  
 
The last issue is politics. Under politics, of course, is the question of whether a country 
will or not subscribe to a serious stabilisation programme. The exchange rate will keep 
falling as long as investors see the central bank print money. And the central bank is 
under pressure to print money to save all the president’s friends, and the exchange rate 
responds appropriately.  
 
The only way to stabilise is high interest rates and a tight budget: what the IMF 
preaches. And the IMF is totally right. Unless it’s expensive to speculate against a 
currency, a currency will not stabilise; until the currency stabilises, there is no prospect 
whatsoever for the economy to settle down, for people to evaluate risks, and for people 
to start reconstruction. So I believe the uncertainty of whether the political process 
would allow an IMF programme to go forward is an essential reason why we have seen 
in Indonesia so much of a problem, before Professor Schliesinger arrived on the scene 
and lent his credibility to a government that had none. Of course, he has left Indonesia 
now, and we have to fear what is Act II.  
 
But the same question was there in Thailand and the government had to fall before the 
confidence returned. The same issue would be there in Korea, were it not for the huge 
current account surplus they have now which frees them to pursue their policy errors. 
So I believe the politics are an important part of the depth of the decline of currencies, 
and the magnitude of instability and again, reflect on poor management in place rather 
than on the international financial system. 
 
Let me ask next how to reform the system to respond to this anatomy of the crisis. I 
think the starting point surely has to be in the countries under attack. And the second 
issue is how to reform the international environment in which these things happen.  
 
In the countries under attack, it is tempting to just stop the attack. There is no way of 
hoisting a white flag. That doesn’t exist in this sport. But surely, there is a way of 
signalling that you want to be very different and that you are taking dramatic steps to 
change the way the country is run. That is the positive way. Or else, you impose capital 
controls, and that’s time out and you say, “We are going for awhile into the Stone Age”. 
I have absolutely no sympathy for capital controls. I am shocked that serious 
professional analysts have come out with that proposal. It’s a crazy idea, it confuses the 
future, it destroys whatever contract credibility is in place and it solves no problems. It 
seemingly solves the problem because the exchange rate isn’t moving anymore, but it 
opens the next question of how you return to the international financial system and how 
much credibility has been destroyed in the meantime. I don’t think that anyone has been 
successful by imposing capital controls in the middle of a crisis and as a result has done 
really well. Surely Malaysia is getting deeper and deeper into problems and surely not 
away from them.  
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I think that the other alternative to sharply change the course of events is the right way, 
and my example of that would be Argentina. Argentina, for a decade, committed every 
single mistake that you can imagine. Every morning, they would wake up the president 
of  
Argentina and he would say, “Is there any, any mistake I have not made yet?” And they 
would say, “Si, Señor” and he would proceed to do just that.  
 
In the early 90s, Argentina literally exploded in hyperinflation, in a collapse of 
production, in hunger and food lines in Argentina that had never been seen in the entire 
history of the country. And that led to the fundamental and profound restructuring of 
the country: one hard money, a currency board that even today, years later, everyone, 
every politician, every taxi driver, every housewife supports without any question. 
Second, a fundamental restructuring of the state, by getting rid of much of it, almost 
most. And as a result, a deep gain in confidence which one can see today.  
 
Seven years ago, Argentina was a country of old people, where the young were getting 
their passports, and getting out. And today, Argentina is run by young people who have 
come home. Who have dynamism, energy and unlimited confidence, unreasonable 
confidence in the future of the country. I think there is only one precedent, and that 
must have been the monetary reform in Germany after WW II, where very much the 
same thing happened, where from one day to the next, a sense of confidence and 
rebuilding happened.  
 
I think that is the appropriate response to a dramatic crisis as Asia has seen, and 
anything else is going to be unsuccessful. Anything else is moving the furniture around. 
Anything else is trying to solve half the problems, leaving the other half for the future, 
with inevitably a question of where growth is going to come from. And if the growth 
doesn’t come back, then of course fragile political systems will be tested much harder.  
 
So I believe at the country level, we have to be extraordinarily demanding and say there 
is a chance for radical reform, and radical with a big R; and then, the success stories are 
there, whether one looks to Chile in the past, or to Argentina. And if that doesn’t 
happen, don’t expect that it’s a small ambush with the financial market that is easily 
overcome and soon will be back where we came from.  
 
I think any radical reform will involve, quite definitely, on the side of the banking 
system, a very dramatic rethinking. So that the banks are well regulated, well 
supervised, well capitalised, and as a result easily can stand high interest rates, and 
therefore, easily can stay in place as the country inevitably gets tested by events beyond 
their control or even by domestic politics. To return to Argentina that happened in ’95 – 
the Tequila Crisis. Argentina was on the short list for having currency problems. Their 
currency wasn’t devalued, interest rates rose, the speculators left.  
 
The same issue is happening now. Everybody knows the banks are even better. The 
interest rates are high. Nobody believes there’ll be a banking problem in Argentina. The 
same is true in Hong Kong. The banks are extremely good. The country is hit extremely 
hard. Nobody believes the banks are going to go under. And the speculators have left. 
They haven’t succeeded. So I believe that the reform surely must include a dramatic 
attention to the banking system, which is the Achilles heel of a country integrated into 
world capital markets, something that today is unavoidable.  
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It takes me to the last question of how to organise the international financial system. 
And in particular what to do with the IMF. And there are two ways to go. One is to say 
that the big problem is that we didn’t have enough money. And if we had had much 
more money, and far more discretion, then the collapses that happened, might not even 
have happened. The money would have been seen, and people would have turned away 
from the bank run. They’d have said, why run? Walk, because there’s enough money on 
the shelf. And of course, that is an extremely tempting idea, except that it is an invitation 
to the process of mismanagement and so “no” to dramatic amounts of money for my 
friend Stan Fischer. Perhaps that’s the way we get him back to MIT.  
 
But what could we do to turn the IMF into an effective instrument? A great effort in the 
surveillance process, prevention process – I think the emphasis should indeed shift to 
that area. What can the IMF require of countries in order to qualify them for support? 
The answer is financial supervision that requires them to have balance sheets that are 
sound. And that means that the only way that a crisis is an honest crisis: something that 
is unexpected, beyond your control, and surely, you should be bailed out. If IMF focuses 
not so much on inflation – not so much on whether you have 3½ or 2 percent budget 
deficit, but entirely on the balance sheet of financial institutions and the national balance 
sheet, and no bail outs for countries that have balance sheets that are out of line. Let’s 
take that risk for the world financial system. Then I think people would learn very 
rapidly.  
 
I think the IMF would do well recommending to many countries to have a currency 
board, to get rid of amateur central banks in Eastern Europe, in Latin America, and 
that would take the exchange rate issue out. The exchange rate issue is gone and the bad 
banks are gone, it will be much, much harder to get spectacular crises. There will be 
some, but they will be easily resolved with a lot of money for the IMF.  
 
So I believe sound banks, currency boards, pre-emptive IMF treatment that makes clear 
that only those who have passed the inspection regularly will qualify for support, creates 
an environment in which government are much more on the spot. They will not make 
the world safe forever, but at least it will avoid the situation where a whole region with 
no terrible finance goes under simply because a little bit of a problem happened and 
next thing the whole house of cards collapsed.  
 
I believe that whenever we have a big crisis, we have a great opportunity to go the right 
way. I think the G7 programme is an attempt to take the wrong way because it’s the 
easier one. I think we ought to challenge the international institutions to be more 
ambitious. To not plead that they are managed by their member governments and 
therefore have to participate in their corruption, and that they should take the 
responsibility of proposing something that is far, far better suited to give us a safe world 
economy. 
 
Thank you very much.  18
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DAY TWO 
 
It’s still a great pleasure to be here. Nobody should leave the room under the threat that 
it gets very formal. I don’t really get very formal. The maximum of formality is to have 
a diagram with two lines. One goes down and the other goes up, and if it doesn’t fit in 
there, then you haven’t figured it out. So we have a few of those, and some countries 
behind. The objective, of course, is to find a simple way of thinking about issues of 
currency crisis, and ask what are the essential ingredients: both the economic structure, 
which ultimately is the setting for the demise, and the political economy which is the 
setting for making the mistakes. That is pretty universal. Whether it is a Lafontaine, 
trying to do populism in Germany, whether it is an Alain Garcia that tries the same in 
Mexico, or whether it is called Kim and it is in Korea. In the end they have the same 
problems and ultimately, mostly the same result. I add mostly because in a very rich 
country you can afford to do very bad things very very long. (That was not a comment 
on Peru.)  
 
I want to focus today on this old new crisis distinction in a little bit more formal way, 
and ask what the old ones looked like, and then focus on Brazil as the new kind. This is a 
crisis, for some it is over. Stan Fischer quietly spent time here on academic issues while, 
perhaps to suggest there is no Brazil problem. If he were in New York, people might be 
worried. But perhaps there is one and it is unresolved and what I propose to do is look 
at that as an example of the new crisis. And the issue is, can a country bear to live with 
an overvalued currency and a high real interest rate to keep the money coming forever? 
And the answer is, “No”. And if you can’t do it forever then one of two things happen: 
either a miracle or a currency crisis. And miracles happen, but often not in this context 
and not in time and that’s the Brazil issue of course.  
 
Well getting ahead, let me talk about the slow motion crisis, the typical developing 
country crisis: first of the kind that one had until the 1980s. And the big question of 
where to draw the line between the old and the new ones.  
 
My reading is that certainly the Mexican crisis of ’95 was entirely the new crisis that had 
to do with a large dollarised short-term debt, with an average maturity of a few weeks. 
Shortened and shortened in a run-up to an election, in a desperate attempt to get to that 
election without a problem. And if you shorten your maturities then you will find some 
creditor who is willing to stick their neck out, because somehow they think a short 
maturity means that they can get their money out. They haven’t figured out that a short 
maturity means that all together they cannot and when one tries nobody will succeed, 
unless there is a bailout and that turned out to be the case.  
 
Another candidate for drawing the line would have been 1982, where we had defaults on 
emerging market debts across the board and that appears in that context. So, 
somewhere either including ’82 or definitely Mexico ’95, that’s the new style of crisis, 
that when it comes happens very, very fast, very, very big. And before you have dull 
crises, that sort of are local, that are uninteresting, that aren’t traumatic, that are a 
relief when they happen, finally, except for the minister of finance. And when they 
happen, they bring the answer: a currency depreciation which is badly needed to get 
back to normality, even though politically they are very controversial.  
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Figure 1 
 
 
Here is my favourite way of looking at these old style crises: I have w/e, that’s the wage 
in dollars and that measures the standard of living and that also measures 
competitiveness [Figure 1]. The wage in dollars is one of the key variables, both in how 
the economy functions and in the political economy. How the economy functions because 
that’s competitiveness: if the wage in dollars is low, then a country has a cost 
competitive position and has a competitive real exchange rate. Wage in dollars is the 
real exchange rate. And the other variable is output. And that means, among other 
things, employment, and that is, of course, a very political variable.  
 
The point of the diagram is that the three lines don’t intersect. And that is, of course, 
what makes something interesting, that is the added of politics. I have as a vertical line 
full employment: there is some level of output at which we have full employment. I have 
the downward sloping line that is external balance, a higher level of output, higher 
imports, deficit: in order to gain competitiveness would need a more a lower wage in 
dollars. Points above into the right are points of deficits, because either output is too 
high or the wage in dollars is too high and therefore it is a deficit. And points below are 
points where you have a surplus because you are competitive, or output, and therefore 
imports are compressed. The normal economy is full employment and external balance 
and that would mean, Point B is happiness and that is where you would be, unless you 
had a way of big reserves, the IMF, the World Bank, Citibank, lending you the money to 
finance external deficits.  
 
But I have added a third line, the flat one, a level of the wage in dollars, which is 
political. Call it “social peace”. If the wage in dollars was less, then you’d have strikes, 
riots, disruption and the point of it is, the wage in dollars, in the way I have drawn it, is 
not compatible with both full employment and external balance. And the moment we 
have the three possibilities, then we’ll say, well, where are we going to be?   20
 
And Point A is, of course, the Latin American equilibrium. Your social peace, that is the 
most important thing, and second your full employment, that is very important, and 
third you find someone to give you the money to run the deficit. And as long as the 
money is there, you happily run the deficit and, then, one day, the money runs out. And 
then you have two choices: you can have a contraction of economic activity, perhaps 
through a fiscal austerity drive, that takes you to Point C or through tight money and at 
Point C you have established external balance. What else can you do, you don’t have the 
money to finance the deficits – but, of course, now you have unemployment. So, worry 
there!  
 
Or you could go to Point B and you have a big devaluation, and a big devaluation of 
course, solves the external balance problem but, of course, it also means that there is a 
lot of unhappiness. The minister falls, there are strikes everyday and, neither C nor B 
are lasting situations. Because the politics of either is that they are unbearable. So what 
will happen? What happens is that you keep going in circles. After a crisis when the 
money runs out, then you go to C, but you don’t really like C, so you try and get some 
money and if you find it you go back to A. Or you get an IMF mission because somehow 
this employment is too much, and they persuade you to take off trade restrictions, 
devalue and you go to B. B is the IMF equilibrium. But IMF equilibrium is not really a 
lot of fun, so you give in to wage demands and that means the wage in dollars starts 
rising and you get back to social peace, but the deficit comes.  
 
In telling the story there is obviously no escape from going around those three points. 
The only happy days are the days where someone gives you money. But you always get 
money. What is available for Latin America has expended for the last hundred years 
and with great regularity, there are currency crises. The situation is a little bit worse 
than I have drawn because if you keep borrowing, then of course, you built up interest 
liabilities. And as a result the level of competitiveness or output that is consistent with 
external balance, that negatively sloped schedule, keeps shifting to the left and your 
problem of social peace becomes harder and harder, unless wonderful things happen in 
an offsetting way to make you more competitive, so that at the same wage in dollars 
your costs fall through productivity growth and you will get ahead. The more the 
interest burden rises and productivity growth isn’t big, the more you get away from an 
equilibrium situation and the more you look like a chicken, going around this 
unemployment, devaluation, inflation, brief moments of happiness, followed by an 
average period where the economy is mostly macroeconomic, because either it is fighting 
an inflation or it is doing the next devaluation to come out of the loss of competitiveness 
of the previous one.  
 
All of this has no capital account in it, other than the sense that someone gives you a 
chunk of money that you spend. But no linkages between domestic interest rates and the 
amount of money that comes in, and no financial crisis. It all has to do with the goods 
market and the current account and how to pay for the excess of spending over income, 
which is what life is all about, at least in Latin America.  
 
The slow crisis is that you know that if you sit at a point like A, and you spend a billion 
and a half every year, and you only have five billion you divide one by the other, it is 
going to take that long and it never it is really true that you get that long, so you know 
that within two years this policy isn’t going to work. And you may surely try and 
lengthen it. You do that by putting tariffs and that is going to shift your BB schedule,  21
your external balance schedule, the negative one, a little bit. But it doesn’t really work so 
well, because the tariffs also reduce the standard of living so they give you wage 
demands.  
 
And the wonderful thing about this is you can keep talking, because when you have 
three points that don’t all intersect, then you have three possible equilibria. And you are 
never going to be able to stay at any one for any period of time, because unemployment 
is impossible forever, except in Europe. And low standards of living are impossible for 
any length of time, except in Russia. And A is impossible for any length of time, unless 
the IMF gets more money to keep everybody there.  
 
That is what international macroeconomics was about before we had opening of capital 
markets and before we had domestic deregulation and before the capital account 
became the principle actor in the story. This one is entirely about competitiveness and 
the standard of living, the play on that. And the new one is entirely about the balance 
sheet and how to get the guys to keep rolling and bringing the money and to keep the 
music playing which is an entirely separate issue. These stories are still there. A big 
devaluation is still a big issue in terms of the standard of living and politics, we see that 
in Indonesia, or we see it in Malaysia. The issue of unemployment is still there in a very 
big way. Look at Korea where the huge unemployment is a major obstacle to the 
restructuring that the government should, and might even want to be doing. But it isn’t 
the principle actor; it is the extra complication in the background. And the principle 
story is really focussing on the balance sheets and what are real exchange rates, interest 
rates, exchange rate expectations that come into play, and threaten that all of a sudden 
the money wants to be leaving.  
 
 
 
Figure 2 
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So let me focus on that and the useful ways to change the axes, but still have one that 
goes up and one that goes down [Figure 2]. Now, because I am concentrating on the 
capital market, the real interest rate appears. Little r is the real interest rate and big R is 
the real exchange rate, and we are going to look at two equilibria, one in the goods 
market, I label it now GG, combinations of real interest rates and real exchange rates, 
such that we have full employment or whatever you like to call goods market 
equilibrium. Points to the right, we have a real exchange rate that is too appreciated, too 
uncompetitive to support full employment, or real interest rate that is too high for the 
given real exchange rate to support full employment. So anything above and to the right 
of GG is a bad situation of unemployment, anything below is happy.  
 
We have FF as the balance sheet line, or the balance of payments line, or the capital 
account line, however you like to call it, and that will depend on the real exchange rate, 
because if it is very appreciated then that is a concern. It invites the thought of real 
depreciation and therefore a loss to investors. To offset that you need high real interest 
rates. So, points down and to the right of FF are happy points where the investors get 
paid. They get paid for exchange rate risk they don’t even see or for whatever risk they 
see, they are more than paid enough and therefore money is coming in plentifully. And 
points above and to the left are situations where investors are not paid sufficiently. They 
see an appreciated real exchange rate, they say here is a problem in the making, and I 
am not being paid enough in real interest to have exposure to that risk. I am leaving. 
And the leaving may be fairly gradual at the front in or it may just be in incipient 
tendency that invites the government very quickly to change the real interest rate in 
order to keep the music playing.  
 
In the face of the new style crisis, keeping the music playing is all-essential. You might 
think of Mexico in ’95: an election in ’94 when the story really started. The crisis was 
December ’94 into ’95 – elections in Mexico every 6 years, a great event, and how to 
make that a happy event: overvalue the exchange rate all the way on, in order to bring 
inflation down, in order to raise the standard of living. Hope that the employment effects 
don’t come too fast. Have a glorious election, and then hope that nothing happens. Hope 
that nothing happens, of course it is never right, because in Mexico every sixth year, is a 
year of a great catastrophe.  
 
Let me show you my favourite picture that goes with Mexico [Figure 3]. I let you guess 
where the election years are in Mexico!  
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Figure 3 
 
 
And you’re right, it has to do with the verticals. There is a little confusion in one of the 
transitions. And there is an interesting question about the year 2000, the next election. Is 
that a flat for a moment and is it going to rise again, in which case you get a vertical in 
2000, or has someone just learned the lesson? But, I use it to say, that in terms of my 
previous diagram, real exchange rates for a while may be appreciating and then the 
increasingly become a problem and how do governments respond to that increasing 
problem. And that takes me back here.  
 
Investors are very, very happy to stay to the very last minute. They ideally want the 
advantage of the very high interest rates that are being paid in the run up to a crisis, and 
leave the night before, get the last train out, the last ticket being written by the Central 
Bank. And if that is done successfully, then of course they have excess returns, because 
they are being paid 40% real, and they get out. And the day after the crisis they come 
back in and collect again huge returns as in the aftermath of a stabilization, interest 
rates are high, inflation is being fought, the exchange rate has over-depreciated. 
Wonderful money is made. And if we always get it right, then of course we become very, 
very famous. That is the game and a great illusion of course, is mostly, that you may not 
be able to get out, except if you really understand that the IMF is always there to write 
extra tickets when the Central Bank has none left. Then you’re going to always be paid 
excess returns and you never have to worry, and Russia spoiled that fun. 
 
Here is my shaded area, sort of the typical country that has a problem. The real 
exchange rate has appreciated; it will have appreciated typically in the process of trying 
to bring down an inflation. The exchange rate was fixed or a crawling peg that moved 
too gradually, too slowly, and because it moved too slowly, prices at home kept rising 
more than the exchange rate depreciated. Competitiveness gradually has been lost.  
 
That loss of competitiveness is starting to show in a declining growth. Not immediately, 
because in the first instance a loss of competitiveness is really a rise in real wages. And a 
rise in real wages raises demand, and a rise in demand raises employment, and the 
minister is smiling every day because it is giving people a really good life. But then over  24
time, of course, it comes to competitiveness that you can’t sell the national output 
abroad that imports become very cheap relative to those domestic exports. Then it goes 
both to output and to employment, and then it starts becoming a problem. That clearly 
is true at my shaded point there. But it is also true that the rest of the world says we are 
seeing a real appreciation and this is uncomfortable because it is already showing in 
growth; it is already showing in an external deficit, and “Am I being paid enough to be 
here”.  
 
As they ask that question, the Minister of Finance comes and gives his speech to say that 
while doing very dramatic reforms, we have even thought of privatizing our state 
enterprises, and we’re looking forward to new corporate subsidy, and I don’t know 
what. Just to keep the money rolling and coming. Money that is necessary because on 
the external side, you need to finance what is now a current account deficit and you 
certainly need to roll over the debt.  
 
These investors will say two things: “I am happy to stay, but I need more. Because my 
exposure is more, because I see that your no-growth situation is a problem. In the end 
you want to escape from it, and I don’t want to be there when you try to escape. I need 
to be paid more. And I cannot make long-term commitments because this is not a story 
that is going to last long. I want my maturities shorter than your story.” And that is, 
what we see over and over again, that as you move gradually into the perception that 
there is a problem, the maturities go down.  
 
How much can maturities go down? Unbelievably, Mexico had an average maturity of 
its public debt that was less than two months. That means that Mexico was basically 
financed in the overnight market. The difference between two-month average means 
that half of them were one week and the other half was two months and a quarter. 
Means the distance from here to Christmas, from the maturing of the whole public debt 
and the need to roll it all over because paying off is inconceivable. The shortening of 
maturities is a very systematic feature of a situation whether the creditors say, “Yes you 
can have money but I want to be able to leave as I perceive a deterioration. Pay me 
more, because I don’t want really to have the angst. The maturity is just so I can leave, 
the paying is so I will stay.” What happens here is that as the real exchange rate 
appreciates the interest rate goes up, the maturity shrinks by a third dimension and my 
balance sheet become increasingly a problem.  
 
But the economy does not get any better. Because the higher interest rates, of course, 
now make the growth disappear more and more, and as the growth disappears, the 
political prospects in an election – this has to do with democracy, right? That’s why they 
get all the money, that they are democracies – the bad guys could win and that means 
shorten the maturity. Don’t have your debt mature after the election! That’s a problem. 
Raise the interest rate because you need to explain afterwards why you are there.  
 
So very, very systematically in every one of the Latin American crises you really see that 
same pattern. It starts with a real appreciation that is the counterpart of an 
inflation/stabilization process, then the real appreciation is really there, the disinflation 
has succeeded but the real exchange rate now is the problem. The government is 
unwilling to deal with the real appreciation problem by any of the known ways: a 
flexible exchange rate, a devaluation and aggressive crawling peg. They don’t want to, 
because everybody is happy. Because they suddenly have high real wages.  
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And then they say, “Never”, and that is the magic word. Once you have said “never”, 
you are committed to the bad mistake. And then you start paying for it. With maturities 
and with interest rates. The more you pay with the interest rate, the less the growth, the 
worse the budget, because you have a high debt that gets rolled at high interest rates, 
and therefore the politics is going to get worse, and you paint yourself into a corner 
where it would be a sheer miracle if in the end you could get out. Mexico is a case study 
of every six years doing exactly the same, and everybody now knows it. Why didn’t they 
know it the last time? Well, they had not seen the picture with enough verticals. But now 
they know it is not going happen before the election, it is going to be the week after. The 
week before the election, everybody wants to leave and that is when your currency crisis 
starts, that is when the Central Bank gets rid of all of it reserves, but doesn’t tell anyone. 
A little bit of smoke and mirrors is essential there, but so far everybody gets through the 
election. 
 
Very, very systematic, happens every time in the context of disinflation – is very much 
the Brazilian story. I emphasize the two ways or I should say, three ways, in which it is 
unsustainable. The first is that you lose economic growth, with very high real interest 
rates, and an uncompetitive exchange rate. You can have whatever real exchange rate, 
but then you need really low interest rates, to offset it. Or you can have very high 
interest rates, but you need a super competitive exchange rate to keep economic growth 
going. If both are in a wrong place, then it is a question of time. So from the growth side, 
and therefore from the politics side, incompatible.  
 
Second, on the budget side, in many situations the high real interest rates are 
unsustainable, because you have a big public debt and the public debt is growing at 40-
50% interest rates that becomes the growth rate of the debt. And it takes only time 
before that debt is unpayable. There is, of course, from growth an influence on the 
budget, which reinforces the fiscal problem. The third is the financial institutions, which 
have of course no way of having their loans paid at these real interest rates and, as a 
result, experience a gradual deterioration in loan quality, and sort of, gradually go 
bankrupt.  
 
But as that process happens, something very, very important gets into play. In this 
economy, where real interests are very, very high, large companies and banks find out 
that you can borrow off shore in foreign exchange for almost nothing. And that means 
the locals bear the exchange risk rather than the foreigners. Foreigners are happy to 
lend at Tokyo-plus-two, and those loans are taken. Suddenly the domestic banking 
system and the domestic corporations, to get away from these very high real interest 
rates, that are rolling at home, reflecting currency risk, take on foreign liabilities. And 
those foreign liabilities are supplied at almost nothing. And they allow, at home, a 
different reality. Suddenly, at 3%, you can buy beach houses to infinity. You can give 
loans to infinity.  
 
So we have the two things: we have one side an exchange rate that is in the wrong place, 
and an interest rate on domestic liabilities that starts reflecting exchange rate risk, and 
on the other side, we have those who have access to the world capital market (large 
firms and banks), borrowing in foreign exchange, getting their hands on a gigantic 
amount of money, which they cheerfully lend out at those high domestic interest rates, 
absorbing in their balance sheet a currency risk.  
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They say, “Well, this is glorious. I am borrowing at 2% and I am lending at 40. I am 
making money like crazy and I am going to have another bank.” And so you get a 
proliferation of banks as the way to go to the world capital market. Get a lower money 
and lend it at home. How long can that last? And you can do that for two or three years. 
But when you have done it, you have packed the whole financial system and the large 
corporations with a dollar denominated debt or yen denominated debt in a situation of 
an exchange rate that is in the wrong place.  
 
The only reason this happens is because everybody says, “Our government is totally 
committed to this exchange rate and then never let going to let it go. And I know those 
guys, I have talked to them, and they are actually my second cousin; and we pay Him.” 
(They don’t say that, but that’s true.) So it is deep confidence of enough people that this 
exchange rate regime will stay and that therefore, borrowing in dollars and lending at 
home and making a spread is money you are making. It’s yours, and you are stupid if 
you are not doing it. 
 
It is totally essential that it need not be everybody. They may also be a lot of people who 
don’t believe in it and think they’re going to make losses. What matters afterwards is 
that some people have done it and they go bankrupt, and that the country has done it 
and is going bankrupt on it. That is the story of whether you look at Chile in the late 
seventies, a fixed exchange rate, Pinochet said, fixed 3.8 forever, and everybody says, 
when Pinochet says “forever”, it is forever, because he is forever. And happily they were 
worrying and of course, when in the 1982 the currency went they all went with it.  
 
Or whether you look at Mexico, where the government did it itself, because they could 
not sell peso bonds anymore, or the Mexican banks did it big time, because they believed 
in the government, or the large Mexican corporations did it, because of the irresistible 
fact that when the domestic interest rate is 40%, and the rate in foreign exchange is 2, 3 
or 5, where do you go? You go for the 2, 3 or 5 and you say, “I know they are not going 
to do anything”, or, “I know they are not doing anything soon”, or, “I know that before 
the election they are not going to do anything.” Whatever rationalisation you need to 
take that magic potion. That is what happens, and that moment, we are having a balance 
sheet that has lots of dollars in it.  
 
Now, the complication, of course, is that the foreign loans are not ten-year loans. It is 
true that they are 3, 4 or 5%, but they are 1 or 2 month loans. So we have a balance 
sheet that is enriched with foreign liabilities in foreign exchange and short maturities. 
And, as a counterpart, we have at home a scene of real appreciation that is 
unsustainable and a real interest rate that is unsustainable. And so the only question is: 
When will the two meet? And something that cannot last forever, there is a theorem that 
says, ultimately will end.  
 
What is important is that the problem has to be identified, not the little circumstances 
that bring the end. That the election is over, often is a good reason. Or, that some 
commodity exports don’t do so well, and therefore someone cannot get the loan renewed 
and that word spreads and therefore others also can’t, and in no time it is a disaster. So 
I wanted to emphasize here the systematic way in which the high interest rates on 
domestic liabilities encouraged the taking of the foreign liabilities, and how the real 
interest rate rising is the offset that foreign investors require to roll the debt positions 
and that the shortening of the maturities is another dimension for the foreign investors 
to reduce what they perceive as their risk, and to increase their flexibility.   27
The worst possible thing, of course, is that the lenders become more flexible just at a 
time where the debtors would want very long horizons. And this world here is run by 
the creditors. The creditors may lose in the end, but they certainly try to the maximum, 
(a) to be paid on a way there and (b) to have the flexibility to make a run, and that is 
how we get the bank run, and third to find someone to bail him out, so that they can 
walk away with the high interest rates and not have made the losses. That is the IMF 
system, of course. 
 
Let me, with that setting in mind, look for a moment at Brazil [Figure 4]. Brazil in my 
judgement is the next candidate. The first thing is, where is the problem? I am looking 
here at the least controversial way of showing Brazil’s real exchange rate. I am just 
looking at Brazil’s wholesale prices in dollars. I am not trying to have a multilateral real 
effective exchange rate weighted by Brazil’s trade with every piece of the world. I’m just 
saying prices, in dollars, in Brazil, what has happened?  
 
 
Figure 4 
 
 
You notice that in ’94, you have a very sharp rise of Brazilian prices in dollars. ’94 is the 
stabilization of inflation; at that time hyperinflation stopped, the exchange rate stopped 
depreciating, in fact, it appreciated for a while, even as domestic inflation came down 
from a monthly rate of 25% to a monthly rate of 2%. But a monthly rate of 2% is still 
almost 30% inflation per year. And that is the post-stabilization here in Brazil: 
substantially 30% inflation. And the following year was still 10% inflation, and the 
exchange rate was fixed.  
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So, Brazilian prices in dollars very rapidly increased by 40%, and that happened fast – 
within the year of stabilization. And since then, they have had a crawling exchange rate, 
accompanying the rate of inflation, and have not lost much in terms of competitiveness, 
but the 40% they had at the front end is still there. You can now quarrel about how 
much is the exchange rate overvalued, and there are two views. One view is that of the 
Brazilian finance minister, who says that there has been dramatic productivity growth, 
and that must be taken into account when looking at Brazil’s competitiveness. But he 
doesn’t have to have productivity growth if it doesn’t show in prices, right? If he pays it 
out in wages, then he has happy people, but it doesn’t make him more competitive. This 
picture here suggests whatever productivity growth was there, wasn’t enough to keep 
down prices in dollars in Brazil.  
 
There is another argument that history is irrelevant. The central banker who has a 
Harvard PhD in economics has said that Brazil is a new country and therefore any 
historical time series are irrelevant. It leaves you speechless, so I’ll leave it just at. And 
there’s a third view – that we have seen that for a century, that there is nothing new 
about it, that it happens systematically in the context of stabilization. The easiest way to 
get inflation down is to have a real appreciation. And when you have real appreciation, 
you have a problem. And when you have that problem, central bankers always say that 
these are the wrong numbers to look at. I find you some other number that you should 
look at. But if you look at wages in dollars in Brazil, it’s even worse. So what should I 
look at? Well, he says I should look at the prices of internationally traded goods. All that 
has nothing to do with Brazil. Our basic problem in Brazil is a big real appreciation. 
 
Brazil is an economy where we have a big fiscal problem, and a big debt problem. We 
have an enormous Ponzi game on the external side going, and the question is whether 
investors will stay with it, or whether they will increasingly run away from it. Let me 
show you the numbers on Brazil so we have a background for the discussion [Figure 5].   29
 
Figure 5 
 
 
Notice, on growth, that it has disappeared. If you took a longer time horizon, Brazil’s 
per capita GDP has not grown over 20 years. So, there is a real growth problem. Before, 
from persistent mismanagement of macroeconomics. Now, from the problem I described 
before: a real appreciation, and high real interest rates to keep the money coming. My 
measure of the real exchange rate has a real appreciation of some 30%, which is big. 
And the real interest rate is 30%, which is big. So, if you put the two in an economy, 
then you should expect to get very little growth. Brazil still had 4% growth. Where did 
that come from? Well, Brazil had a privatisation programme, and all the governors who 
privatised all the local public utilities took all that money and spent it. So, populism – 
populism kept the economy growing. Why? Because ’98 was an election year.  
 
But notice, for an election year, this is very little growth, right? A good Latin American 
election year has 5%, right? But, the real interest rate was so gigantic, and the real 
exchange rate so over-valued, that even with furious government spending, you barely 
got 0.4% growth for ’98. The inflation rate is gone. That is the exchange rate policy. 
And, of course, by now, the increase in recession, so inflation isn’t a problem, and 
everybody says, “The good president Cardoso stopped inflation, and he has privatised”. 
He has privatised. What happened to the money? And stopping inflation…is it really 
over if the real exchange rate has appreciated so much, and is left as the next problem? 
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You see a glorious budget deficit [Table 1]. 8% budget deficit is not small. Much of that 
is debt service, because if you have a good-sized public debt, and you have a real interest 
rate of 30-40%, it costs a lot of money. And I return to that issue, because the miracle, if 
it happens, is to get those interest rates down by an outbreak of confidence. There is a 
good-sized current account deficit for an economy that isn’t growing. Think of a very 
substantial compression of imports, surely any investment goods. Nobody is investing at 
30-40% real interest rates. Those are the interest rates on government paper. The 
interest rates from banks, real, are far, far higher than that. 
 
We have an external debt that is relatively small, and we have a domestic debt that is 
small, because four years ago the previous president wiped out the public debt by having 
a hyperinflation with fixed nominal interest rates. So, this is a new public debt four 
years old, and rising – and rising rapidly.  
 
So, here is our typical new-style crisis. New style, because the whole issue is to keep the 
debts going. Brazil’s external debt is $100 billion with an average maturity of 3 months. 
And Brazil’s internal debt is probably dollarised, and has a maturity of something like 4 
months. And that means that every day is an important day to keep the music going. 
You pay a huge real interest rate to keep rolling this domestic debt, and the foreign 
banks, because of Asia, are very intensely concerned to get risk off their balance sheet, 
because risk means that their stock prices are low, and low stock prices means that the 
stock options of management are worth very little. So, they want to get out.  
 
In Brazil, the music kept playing, because the key issue was that the president should get 
re-elected: first that he should get a constitutional amendment, to get re-elected, and 
then, in the election actually to get re-elected. And that provided the continuity that 
everybody knew nothing bad was going to happen, until the election. And that whatever 
you could do by moving the furniture, they would do it, to keep the music going till the 
election. 
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It didn’t quite work, because everybody said, “It’s true that until the election, nothing 
happens, but the day after, something really bad could happen. Like, they could devalue 
to get the monkey off their back.” And you don’t want to be there, so you have to leave 
before the election. Brazil had huge reserves -- 75 billion dollars – and they lost 
essentially, 40 billion dollars in reserves, on the way to the election. So, they were forced 
to go to the IMF before the election. But the IMF was very gracious. They said, “We like 
Brazil. And we want to support Brazil, because the alternative candidate was a Marxist, 
so the US Treasury had a bid interest in it. And we want to support Brazil, because we 
don’t need an international financial crisis, and our banks are in there too. So, this is 
different from Russia. We want to avoid that this blows up before the election.”  
 
The IMF announced that it was totally willing to give Brazil a big package, and the 
investors said, “Well, then we can really hang around.” But the banks were still 
uncomfortable, because they say, if your long run’s off, don’t roll it over for 3 months, 
because you are really not sure that this is going to work. So, for Brazil, capital flight 
substantially continued at the pace of 5 billion dollars a week, running down the 
reserves. Brazil’s Brady bonds fell very, very sharply because now, you were coming to 
the end of the good news, and bad stuff could be happening. The Brazilian government, 
quietly, not letting anyone know, bought between 6 and 10 billion dollars of its own 
Brady bonds, which today are shown as reserves, although, of course they are totally un-
useable. 
 
So, every smoke-and-mirror trick in the book was used, and the IMF everyday was 
saying, “The money is coming. Do not worry,” even though Brazil had never said 
publicly that they would actually do some adjustment programme that would justify the 
IMF money. But, something else was done, very important, and ultimately a big issue, 
that in the discussion about Brazil’s problems, the Brazilian government trained the 
investors to say, “The exchange rate is not a problem. The budget is.” The investors all 
became docile, they would say, “A fiscal problem that needs to be addressed, the 
exchange rate, not.” 
 
For the IMF, that was extremely congenial, because they do not want ever to be seen 
saying, “A country has to devalue.” Why? Because the Wall Street Journal would go 
crazy. And, the adjacent country, Argentina, would be a fantastic problem. So, the IMF 
is totally happy to say Brazil has a fiscal problem. They don’t have an exchange rate 
problem. As if you could cut the budget deficit, and sustain full employment at an 
unchanged real exchange rate. And so, the IMF essentially bought into the Brazilian 
story, because it was politically convenient. In that way, accepting that Brazil, with a 
fiscal correction (if it happens) would get a recession and might stay in that recession for 
a long period of time, but the exchange rate was outside the debate. And if the exchange 
rate was outside the debate, then confidence in the exchange rate might be stronger. And 
if it’s stronger, then the interest rates could come down, and then the fiscal problem 
would go away, and then if nobody ever looked at the growth issue, then everything 
would be alright.  
 
That’s the script that is being enacted now. A president has done a proposal of a 3% of 
GDP budget correction. There is a major issue of whether it actually happens. It 
involves mostly taxing old people and tricks like that. It’s supposed to happen over the 
next three years. The congress is balking at it, but that is on the table and the IMF 
money has arrived, and now the bet is on whether there is a significant outbreak in 
confidence. People saying, Brazil is on the way to doing things right. And you ought to  32
get in there, because you get 30% and the exchange rate isn’t going to be a bad surprise, 
because the IMF programme says, “Don’t change exchange rate policy.” Over time, the 
gradual 7% depreciation that they’re doing over time, piece by piece, wills back some 
competitiveness, and if you hang around, you could have 3 wonderful years of earning 
excess returns, under the umbrella provided by the IMF. 
 
The other view is that Brazil is going into a deep recession. That that recession is 
reinforced by the fiscal contraction, and that in 3-4 months, we’re looking at something 
that cannot last. And that there’s a theorem that something that cannot last will 
ultimately end pretty fast. And then the capital flight starts again, and if it does 5 billion 
a week, then you have a month before it’s over. So, carnival is really when hunting 
season starts, because either you have a collapse of interest rates, because everybody 
says, “We love Brazil. The problems are solved. The government has done 3% of GDP 
in measures, of which they implement 1%, and that’s enough. Never mind the other 7% 
budget deficit. The interest rate has come down. The growth isn’t so bad. And you can 
just muddle on. You’ll be vulnerable forever, but you can muddle on. And you don’t 
have a lot of growth, but who cares?” 
 
Or, people say, “In Brazil, no growth is culturally totally unacceptable, and in time, 
fiscal measures don’t happen. In time, this balance sheet is getting worse and worse. 
Leave while you can.”  
 
So, I think Brazil is a wonderful example of the mix of the new and the old. The new is 
there with very, very short maturities, with people waking up every day to check 
whether Brazil is still there, because they have their money in there, with extraordinary 
amounts of interest, while it’s okay. With the IMF umbrella to put a lot of money on the 
shelf. To write tickets on the assumption that if people see the tickets then they stay 
rather than leave. With the politics behind it that we have a totally unsustainable macro 
equilibrium, in real interest rates and real exchange rates.  
 
A very , very important extra point that comes out of a study of two MIT students: 
Goldfajn and Valdes. They ask the simple question, “When you have a large real 
appreciation, what is the probability that it sort of gradually goes away?” Gently and 
gradually, rather than with a collapse of the currency. And they looked at the 
probability for a 5% real appreciation, and yes, they sort of go away. And they looked at 
10, and they looked at 20, and they looked at 30. And they found that anything above 
25% real appreciation always ends with a collapse. Well, Brazil is well above the 25%. 
Therefore, by their research on 40 years of exchange rate regimes, the probability that 
this will work is zero. The answer from Brazil is that Brazil is different. 
 
So, here is my next crisis. It has all the ingredients from the politics of how much fun it 
is to have a disequilibrium real exchange rate, to how to finance it. And the bottom line 
of it is that, of course, the real economy does not do well when that game is being played. 
An economy like Brazil having 0 growth in per capita income on average for 20 years is 
a scandal. Seeing it as a democracy surely is wrong, because next door is Argentina 
doing it perfectly right with an average growth rate of 6% with aggressive restructuring, 
with aggressive regime change, ”We’re saying, we’re going to get out of the rot”.  
 
Here, the lesson hasn’t been learned here. And the hope, or the scenario, where 
everything works out is that you have 2% growth for the next 10 years, which, for a 
country with near 2% population growth, is another decade of no growth in per capita  33
GDP. That it should work would be amazing because a balancing act like that is, of 
course, vulnerable. You need, everyday, very, very sunny weather because the slightest 
thing goes wrong with that short debt, a problem comes. But it may be even worse, that 
within 2-3 months this has blown up, because the real exchange rate is too central to the 
economy, and nobody really believes that at this real exchange just doing something on 
the budget is a viable strategy. 
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DAY THREE 
 
It's a great pleasure today to try and defend myself as I disqualify some remedies as 
dumb, even though a distinguished colleague of mine has advanced them and many 
people feel that finance must surely not be allowed to interfere with daily life. There is in 
everybody a populist streak that somehow believes that maybe money should be done in 
moderation and discretely and not at the expense of others and surely taking it to the 
point of destroying in higher economies is utterly indecent and when it takes that 
extreme, then extreme measures are appropriate, whether it be bigger bail-outs or 
capital controls. I will argue that capital controls are not an attractive solution for the 
world economy, that they don't solve the problem and that they encourage the worst. 
But that is an immediate response to the provocation of my sponsor, who said we were 
coming to the interesting part of the policy discussion and it is a reaction pre-emptive to 
a challenge no doubt from Professor Musgrave, whose judgements surely will be 
respected. 
 
What I want to do is ask how to create a better world. In the end, if we have a diagnosis 
of the problem, we see a very active economic and by now a social problem - it's a 
plausible question to ask, “How to create a better world?” And that surely has two 
dimensions: one of them is in the individual countries, what do they have to do, and the 
second, is there a way of organising the international system in a fashion that also 
provides a better playground? Medical analogies are totally appropriate, and the very 
first thing surely is that the sick have to make sure that they don't get sick and the 
second one is to have better health care facilities, so that when people come to the 
hospital, they don't die there. And the third is: whatever public health initiatives are 
appropriate so that everything is a much healthier place in the first place. 
 
With those analogies in mind, there is also, of course, always the question of where most 
of the effort is appropriate. It, surely, isn't right to say "we all have to do better", which 
means everybody says "well, let them do it and I don't need to". I think that 99 and 3/4 
per cent of the effort has to be in individual countries and the clearer that is made, the 
more they will do in the direction of avoiding to be crisis-prone and in responding better 
when accidents happen - and, of course, there is an issue for the international 
community: but even there the balance between a bail-out, once one is a bad situation, 
and efforts to create a better environment which will lead to fewer problems is very 
important to emphasise, and 99 and 3/4 per cent of the action has to be in creating a 
preventive environment, and then, as an aftermath, and as an after-thought, a little 
question of if then is an honest mistake, if there something does go wrong, should we just 
deplore that fact or should we try and do something about it? 
 
But I think that the question goes further inevitably to ask whether the exchange rate 
relations among the major industrialised countries that, at first sight, have nothing to do 
with the default of a Russia, of a Thailand, in a deeper way do have a bearing, and if 
there is a bearing, whether it helps to limit the range of fluctuations of those rates, 
simply because there is a suspicion of, perhaps, a firm realisation that they have a 
bearing on the problem that they are part of the cause, and for that reason they should 
be abolished. 
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That, of course, in itself is a proposal that has been made in advance in France with 
some enthusiasm - the French always like to fix things - and it now gets great sympathy 
from Germany’s leading amateur economist. So, I will address the issue and the answer, 
of course, has already been given by the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury who said, "fixed 
exchange rates are dumb". 
 
Let me start positioning the topic and saying: "In the individual countries, how do you 
assure that the crisis issue is handled better?" And I think that has two perspectives. 
First, to have an environment in which having a financial crisis is substantially less 
likely, and the second one, if even so something has happened, what is the right 
response? The question of how to have fewer financial crises or a smaller likelihood of a 
financial crisis really has to do with an institutional setting where you have far more 
stability - and with far more stability, far less of an incentive for large adverse 
speculative positions. And the cornerstone of that, looking at all the crises we have had, 
is to see that the exchange rate always is a very central part of it or becomes a very 
central part of it. I say "is or becomes", I make that distinction because in Russia, there 
was no exchange rate issue until everybody wanted to leave. And, when everybody wants 
to leave, then, what is actually a public finance problem, very quickly becomes an 
exchange rate problem. In other situations, the exchange rate is very much part of the 
problem to start with in large current account deficits and in a loss of growth, and my 
talk yesterday about Brazil is very much that. The exchange rate is the central part of 
the story – the more people believe that a large devaluation could be happening by 
choice of the government, or inevitably once there is one-way-traffic to get out of the 
country and nobody on the other side. When the possibility of a large exchange rate 
movement comes, and then, of course, excess profits lure in, anyone, call them 
speculators, call them investors, call them arbitrageurs – if it's sufficiently certain they 
are arbitrageurs, they aren't even speculators. So the exchange rate is there, that's what 
provides the extra 20, 30, 40 per cent, that's what it makes it worthwhile looking at. 
Nobody is going to move a lot of capital for a half percentage point, unless it's a very 
certain proposition - and everybody will, for 20, 30, 40 per cent that are quite likely.  
 
How does one deal with the exchange rate? One answer is to have a floating exchange 
rate. And a market-determined floating rate always is in the right place, and if it's in the 
right place, then nobody can form the assumption that, soon, it's in a very different 
place because if that was really a credible belief, then, of course, it would be already 
there. So, flexible exchange rates are incredibly tempting because they are the right 
exchange rates, and how can they be an invitation to a significant speculative problem? I 
think that isn’t an attractive answer, because a flexible exchange rate doesn't really 
exist. Every country has a central bank, and every central bank doesn't like the 
exchange rate that they see in the market, and shortly afterwards they will manipulate 
the exchange rate. And the moment they manipulate the exchange rate, we’re back to 
exactly the same set of issues that would be there under a fixed rate. Perhaps they have a 
little bit less incentive to have deeply misaligned rates, but I haven't seen an exchange 
rate that hasn't met a central bank that didn't want to do something to it - and always in 
the wrong direction.  
 
So, I rule out the distinction between pegged rates and flexible rates. I do not believe, in 
the countries we are talking about, a fully flexible rate is really acceptable. When the 
politics goes bad, the central bank will support the exchange rate, and when they 
support the exchange rate, they do exactly what the Thai government did or the Korean 
government did, no difference whatsoever, and they'll have the high interest rates, and  36
we know the high interest rates aren't sustainable, and we are back entirely to the 
discussion we have had, whether it's a talk about Britain under fixed exchange rates, or 
we are talking about any other economy that had something different from a fixed rate 
system, but in the end, had just the same currency crisis. And Indonesia might be a good 
example, because for a moment they thought they had a flexible exchange rate but it 
really wasn't. So one has to go further in saying what to do about the exchange rate, and 
the right view is to abolish the exchange rate. A country that doesn't have an exchange 
rate can't have a currency crisis. Now, not having an exchange rate, of course has a 
pretty radical implication because it essentially disarms the central bank. And 
disarming the central bank has two problems: one, that there are people who say 
monetary policy is a very important tool of economic policy, and economic policy is 
employment creation, responding to shocks, doing something to make the economy 
function better. And giving up the central bank because you have now an exchange rate 
that is gone – that is too extreme. The right response to that, I think, is that very, very 
few countries in fact can exercise an independent monetary policy. It's certain that 
Europe can, it's certain that the U.S. can, and it's almost certain that nobody else can. 
They can entertain the illusion, and they can pay high interest rates as they practice that 
illusion and the more they do so the higher the interest rates, but the results are very 
substantially in doubt. It is true that like Thailand, they can lower interest rates below 
Singapore for all of three months, if they spend 40 billion dollars on it, but if they don't 
have 40 billion dollars to invest in that experience, it isn't even going to take that long. 
There is an illusion in Mexico that they have monetary independence, and that's why 
their interest rates are 36 per cent, and they pay 36 per cent for that privilege. Brazil has 
independent monetary policy. Their real interest rate is 40 per cent, and that's what they 
are paying for having a central bank.  
 
So, independent monetary policy as the argument for having a central bank is really a 
stupid proposition. Wherever you have a banana republic practising its independent 
central bank, they’re having New York plus. And the more they practise it, the bigger 
the plus. The notion that any country on the periphery of the world could lower its 
interest rates below New York because the risks there are so far less than in New York, 
that's adventurous thinking. I think there is one country in the world that teases its 
investors by saying "we can, of course, look to the day where we pay less than in New 
York because in the long run, we will have a better inflation performance and therefore 
look to currency appreciation". That is being said in Argentina but it's being said 
tongue-in-cheek while they enjoy their currency arrangements which get them closer to 
New York than any other emerging market. 
 
So, I want to emphasise that the argument monetary policy independence, on the 
periphery of the world, is something that is a grave and deep illusion. Cutting your 
interest rates below New York is something you can do if you are much more wonderful 
than New York. More wonderful, in the sense of having a prospect of currency 
appreciation, and more wonderful in the sense that the sovereign risk is less than that of 
the United States of America. The two together on the periphery of the earth would be 
surprising. Maybe a Singapore can do it – maybe: Maybe a totally dead Japan can have 
low interest rates, but surely not Romania or Bulgaria, or Poland or Brazil, or Mexico, 
or for that purpose, Thailand or Korea.  
 
But there is another important argument about the exchange rate and the central bank 
and the money - that a country's money is the very expression of its sovereignty. A 
money has to do with national identity, with national pride, and to give up a money is to  37
give up yourself. And that is sort of a joke, because think of the typical Latin American 
economy. They will have had their first money some time around 1893, shortly after 
they were pushed off the gold standard, and they will since then have had 20 - 30 
monetary reforms: everyone either taking off the zeroes, you always do that when you 
put the force, or having simply new names on the money. It's the peso, then it's the hard 
peso, then it's the gold peso, then it's the new peso, and then you run out of pesos and go 
to other names, right? Then you have a dollar for Hawaii because things are really bad, 
and then you go back to the pesos. Anyone who has studied Argentine monetary history 
knows that you can paper the whole wall of the Senatssaal with the various kinds of 
pesos they have had in the past century. So, the point is, anyone who takes pride in that, 
has to ask themselves whether they are really serious. If people did to the national flag 
what they have done to their money, they would all be in jail. The argument that it's 
national pride that makes you have a money is very expensive proposition. I can't accept 
that anymore, everybody understands that the problems of Latin America, for example, 
is the deep mismanagement of money. And the sooner one can get rid of the money, and 
the more radically one can get rid of the money, even if that is a new proposition, the 
sooner there is a prospect of economic stability, sustained growth, fewer social problems 
and more reason to have national pride. 
 
So, how does one get rid of an exchange rate? I think there are three ways to do it: one 
doesn't work, one works, and one works very well. Not working is to say, "And now we 
have a fixed exchange rate": That works until further notice. And monetary history in 
every country is replete with the proud minister stabilising, announcing the fixed 
exchange rate and everybody is saying, "That's what they always say at this time". And 
it lasts for a while, and it's typically in the context of a stabilisation programme. It 
typically works in reducing the inflation, it typically means that an overvaluation is built 
up, and in time that exchange rate comes under question, as it does, the interest rates 
will start increasing, and then it's a question of time. 
 
So, fixed exchange rates of the garden variety of administer announcing that that's our 
policy is a proposition that instils very, very little credibility, that costs significantly in 
the interest rates for the very reason that it has failed a thousand times, and for that 
reason is both expensive and ineffective. I don't think today that anyone who says "we 
have a fixed rate" would get anyone else to make a bet on that lasting more than five 
years, at odds different from ten to one. 
 
The far better way, of course, is to have deep institutional change that makes it virtually 
impossible to change the exchange rate. That is hard to accomplish because on the 
periphery of the earth, institutions don't really exist. A country like Brazil has many 
constitutions, and most of the time they are spending, amending the last one. And when 
it gets too big, then they make a new one, and then they'll amend that for the next ten 
years. But there are constitutions and then there are fundamental laws, and they all 
have to do with how you can't repudiate your debt and how the government can't steal 
from the people and then it's done under some other pretext. 
 
So, one has to go very, very far in creating an institutional environment to actually make 
sure that the exchange rate is beyond the reach of politicians, at least with reasonable 
ease and that the central bank is taken out of the process of managing the exchange rate 
with great assurance. That is technically impossible. But, there are two facilitating 
circumstances. One is if a country has suffered a deep disillusion about its ability to 
manage its own money, surely that is the case in a hyper-inflation, surely that is the case  38
when most citizens have left the national money and hold deutschmarks or dollars, 
whatever they are closest to, and then de facto, the public supports a hard money. That's 
what they themselves have chosen; that's what they themselves most easily accept the 
central bank should be doing.  
 
That disillusion is the best institutional support for hard money. One sees that in 
Germany in a continuous support of an anti-inflation and a relatively independent 
central bank. One sees it in Germany in the strong reaction of the public to the 
proposition of Lafontaine that the central bank should be managed by him, and not the 
independent council. That is the very, very best thing you can do - a lot better than what 
you write on paper. But the second part, of course, in any functioning democracy, is to 
put very substantial hurdles against the discretionary change in exchange rates. 
Substantial hurdles are great majorities in parliament with which an exchange rate 
change can be done, but it takes that majority. And it takes a discussion, which in itself, 
of course, is something that is virtually impossible in the context of exchange rates. 
Argentina has done just that, in the context of a hyper-inflation, a total disillusion. In the 
early nineties, everybody was dollarised already, and the stabilisation proposal is, "This 
time, we don't do what we always say. Promise we are going to be good, fix the exchange 
rate and not do anything else. Instead, get rid of the central bank, put in the constitution 
that the exchange rate can only be changed with a two-thirds majority of parliament, 
and put the central bank on a hard currency board arrangement", meaning that money 
supply changes respond one-for-one to foreign exchange purchases, with absolutely no 
discretion or intervention. And that means monetary policy is gone: when foreign 
exchange comes in, the central bank buys it at the fixed rate and issues pesos, and when 
foreign exchange leaves, then the central bank is financing it by contracting the supply 
of pesos as they sell dollars in support of the exchange rate. And the central bank 
becomes a very, very dull place. And it's essential that it be a dull place. A dull central 
bank is the best central bank. And that central bank the same day will have to abolish its 
wonderful pension plans; it will have to abolish its cheap mortgages for employees and 
that's why they are so big; it will have to stop supporting the government's budget 
because they can't create money anymore at pleasure to finance the deficit - a totally 
new world. 
 
A currency board arrangement, a fixed exchange rate and a central bank that has no 
discretionary power over the money supply has bank supervision, perhaps, as a 
responsibility but nothing else, is a very, very good system. That used to be the British 
colonial arrangement, so that in the colonies people could put their local heroes on the 
money, but not play with it, and it is becoming fashionable at least in discussion, but also 
in one spectacularly successful case, and that is Argentina. It's used in other instances, 
but I think the Argentine experience is the one that deserves most attention because, 
one, it has lasted, and two, it has been extremely successful as a cornerstone of reform in 
an economy, and three, it has produced an average growth rate of six per cent. And, in 
Argentina, that's a first in this century. So, the notion that a currency board is the first 
step to crucifixion is really totally incorrect. On the contrary, it may well be a very 
decisive and very pervasive step, to creating people's expectations of how their economic 
life functions. More so, the more their life has been degraded by persistent monetary 
debasement that has been the main part of macroeconomic experience. 
 
Technically, a currency board is easy at the end of a hyper-inflation because the whole 
country, already, is on the dollar, everybody has bought the dollars, the all have them in 
their pocket, and the only thing that is left is the central bank trying to squeeze some  39
more of the local money on to unwilling customers. Then, it is truly easy and, of course, 
the public will support it. It is also attractive because the moment it is done, inflation is 
over from one day to the next because one step allies as the key price that everybody 
watches. A currency board is much, much harder in a country that isn't in an obvious 
crisis, that therefore would wish to muddle on with minor measures rather than with 
extreme medicine. It is much harder in a country that isn't fully dollarised or fully on 
the deutschmark, and it is much harder in country that still believes that the central 
bank can do a little bit either for the government's budget finance through an inflation 
tax, or it can do a little bit even to create employment: a much more ambitious task for a 
central bank that takes a higher degree of money illusion. But I make that distinction 
because it is often said that a currency board isn't a practical proposition. But what is a 
practical proposition, of course, has to be judged against the alternative, and to have a 
currency crisis every four years and a dead default every five years, and no per-capita 
growth for twenty years does not strike me as a very practical way of running an 
economy. So, against that, a hard money move, even if it takes intellectual discipline, 
decisiveness, commitment of political capital, seems a very, very worthwhile investment.  
 
There is also an argument that a currency board requires that the central bank be able 
to back the money supply with foreign exchange, and if they don't have the foreign 
exchange, then they can't even start. I think that is most of the time not an active issue 
because countries on the verge of a currency crisis or beyond it, typically have relatively 
little domestic money left and with the devaluation that inevitably will have happened, 
the exchange reserves left easily back the remaining money supply. But where that isn't 
true, surely the extra three privatisations will supply the foreign exchange to do it, or 
even the borrowing used rather to create a currency board than to have one more 
month of a party. So I dismiss the argument the reserves aren’t there, therefore we 
cannot do it because the same people who say it are about to waste the privatisation 
revenues or the access to the capital market.  
 
I want to come to a key question of whether there is something better than a currency 
board. And the something better is of course to give up altogether the national money, 
and directly use foreign exchange.  
 
I think that has two dimensions. One is that if the country isn’t substantially equipped 
with foreign exchange in everybody’s pocket already, then it’s more expensive to say, 
“Go on the dollar because everybody needs dollars”. It isn’t just that the central bank 
needs some money, and perhaps enough money to back the money supply. I think that is 
a technical issue that is important.  
 
The second one is: what money to choose? That is an obvious question if you live next 
door to Germany or Europe; with the euro coming it’s an obvious proposition in Latin 
America, it is less obvious anywhere else. Except, one has to look a Hong Kong. Hong 
Kong isn’t near anyone else other that China and is doing very, very well on the dollar. 
The Hong Kong Currency Board has left Hong Kong standing far, far better than any of 
the other economies in Asia except in China. So I think that is a secondary issue with 
whom to do it if one is lost somewhere a little bit distant from either Europe or the U.S. 
It is really a secondary issue as to what currency to fix to. The trade pattern is one 
concern, international capital markets are another, and is it the euro or the dollar? That 
is not the key question although it’s well worth technical consideration. 
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Why is it little bit better to totally give up the national heroes and use a good money in 
existence? The argument of course is that a newly created currency board creates with it 
the suspicion that it will not last. When the national money is gone it is very hard to 
bring it back to life. It just is not there anymore, but a currency board has national 
money outstanding. There is banking system that may not be operating totally in foreign 
exchange, and therefore the flirtation with the devaluation will always be there as a 
possibility. We see that in Argentina, where there is a moderate premium of peso 
interest rates over dollar interest rates. It’s moderate but it is still there and it reflects 
the remote possibility that there could be a devaluation. But that premium at the outset 
in Argentina was much more significant, because here was a country that had never 
stuck to anything and why should you believe that they will stick to this one. So there is 
certainly a transition period which takes away some of the sheer stabilisation that one 
hopes from the medium, and that of course would be eased if one went all the way to the 
dollar and did not have that intermediary step.  
 
There is also the little bit of suspicion that is nourished by the Polish experience in 1927. 
Poland had chosen to go to hard money. They had created a currency board, and they 
had created an independent central bank that was functioning totally on the currency 
board principle, but they had left the creation of coins to the treasury. In its despair the 
treasury created a mini hyperinflation by minting coins; but under the sheer weight of 
the coins that also stopped. But bear in mind that if public finance is an issue then even 
who gets to make the coins, and are they part or not of the currency board, is a serious 
issue, and there will always be the temptation to create some local dollars or some local 
quarters, and that, even that, needs attention more so the harder is public finance.  
 
So for me the decisive question then is, somewhere between currency board and being 
outright on foreign exchange, with important technical questions of under a currency 
board can small change be local and can that be limited seignorage and is there a little 
bit of room in a pre-set, and responsible way not to give the seignorage, the revenue for 
money creation at that level, away. Those are interesting and important questions. They 
are worth a quarter percent of GDP, but that is a decisive part of revenue. To some 
extent one can do that, just as the stabilisation of the German hyperinflation, there was 
a one-time, limited money issue. But it was one time and it was limited and therefore it 
was compatible with stabilisation. I think the same kind of possibility exists in a 
transition to a currency board or even in a transition to being all the way on the dollar.  
 
Some countries in the Caribbean are all the way on the dollar except for small change, 
so that anything less than a dollar bill they can do themselves and put the heroes on. 
Yes, there is the risk of the Polish maybe hyperinflation of the little coins, but you also 
can exaggerate your inflation fears. So, I think there is territory to operate between 
being all the way on the dollar and a currency board with interesting issues where a 
political compromise can be made without great responsibility. But the decisive issue is 
to disarm totally the central bank, to have it therefore completely removed from public 
finance, put on automatic pilot and in that way take away the currency issue all 
together. And that that should be substantially institutionalised, whatever is the hardest 
legal arrangement in the country, and that the public should substantially come to the 
support of that in understanding that is the best chance to a rising per-capita GDP. 
Which means someone has to give a speech that says we have forever ruined people's life 
by the operation of the national central bank. Everybody will nod when that speech is 
finally given and that's the first step to doing things right. 
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I want to take Brazil as an example of how to get out of a problem. Brazil's real interest 
rate is 40 per cent, and it's 40 per cent because nobody believes that the exchange rate 
will stay. And the government says "it will stay" - and people say "well, I'm not 
surprised you should say that. Governments always say that at this stage of the game. 
But I don't believe it, and therefore, to lend in local currency, I need to be paid 40 per 
cent". 40 per cent, of course, is a lot, because even a likely depreciation in Brazil would 
have to be a Russian problem, but everybody has seen Asia and it's always a hundred 
per cent, so get yourself enough. Brazil's real exchange rate is a problem - in a recession, 
it's a bigger problem - the exchange rate will be looked at as the prime suspect in the 
months and perhaps the year to come. And nothing would persuade people that the 
government's commitment to depreciate the exchange rate at seven per cent per year 
steadily and no faster, even though agreed with the IMF, in the end is actually going to 
happen. And because nobody believes that with great assurance, the interest rates will 
not go down, and if the interest rates do not go down, then it is not going to be true 
because in the end, it's unviable.  
 
How do you break out of that? Well, the president could give another speech that he is 
totally determined. His minister could give the six-hundredth speech. But everybody 
knows: anything that can't work isn't going to work. Why not do the extreme? Well, the 
extreme - people say, "no, we don't want to devalue". But that isn't the extreme. 
Devaluing, of course, would seem to solve the competitiveness problem, might well even 
solve it, but of course will create a balance sheet crisis because there are huge liabilities 
in dollars, will surely raise an inflation issue, and will surely raise the question of what 
comes next with the exchange rate because here it has gone once, surely that isn't the 
end of the story. So, devaluation, yes that is a radical answer, but it isn't really a lasting 
and final solution. It just means that the next five years will also be macroeconomics 
rather than getting out of that and doing something else.  
 
The radical answer in Brazil is to just have a currency board on the U.S. dollar. It's 
radical because it is totally unspeakable that a large, inward-looking sovereign country 
that has taken pride in its own mismanagement for the past 50 years, should just say 
"we have screwed up forever, and we are now going to give the people liberation from 
our central bank". That's hard. But, it's so hard because everybody says, "You know, 
what's so bad? Inflation has stopped". They aren't saying, "We have had zero per-
capita growth for twenty years, we have the worst income distribution than any other 
country in the world.” That is not the main domestic theme. The government has been 
extremely able in the past few years to keep the music going by borrowing and spending. 
Of course, the borrowing is over and the privatisations have been spent, and now comes 
the reality check. That reality check is going to be far, far more effective by having the 
fiscal adjustment mostly done by a gain in confidence from a hard currency 
arrangement, rather than trying with increased taxes to run off their budget that doesn't 
get better because of recession, recession that doesn't get better because the interest 
rates are so high. I think that vicious cycle has to be cut. I think a currency board is an 
answer. Introduce it. It will not immediately command full credibility. It may well be 
that Brazil pays ten percentage points more than New York, but right now they are 
paying 35 per cent more than New York.  
 
Ten per cent would be a very, very modern premium, but even that isn't clear because 
Argentina next door has given the example, has shown the success, and investors might 
well believe that this is the decisive regime change that everybody has been waiting for. 
They might well get extremely excited with what just has happened, and Brazil might  42
never have any hardship at all. And, yes, that's possible. But, I think that may be too 
optimistic. Maybe there is some scepticism to start with, but surely the interest rate 
problem would be very substantially solved. With that, the growth problem would be 
substantially solved. With that, the budget problem would be substantially solved, and if 
they are solved, then Brazil could suddenly start being a normal country.  
 
So, I believe, currency board in Brazil, while it's a huge change, it's exactly the huge 
change that is required, so that macroeconomics is not the dominant story of everyday 
life as it has been in the past twenty years, with hyper-inflation, with price-freezes, with 
maxi-collapses, with wiping-out of debts, and all the adventures that have been 
practised. It's an extreme measure. It's something that in 1970, nobody would ever have 
advocated, but after another twenty years of monetary experiments, it suddenly 
becomes an extreme, plausible cure. 
 
The difference of currency board versus all the way on the dollar, I think you want 
something that can work fast and easily. In Brazil, the reserves and the IMF package 
are widely enough to back the local money supply. There is no issue here. 
 
There is a second question in that context, of course, whether fiscal policy has to be part 
of the support for a currency board. And, I think, the more important question, what 
has to be happening in the macroeconomic structure of a country to make a currency 
board viable. I think the fiscal discussion is exaggerated, much as the discussion about 
European monetary union needing fiscal co-ordination and a Waigel pact; they have 
nothing whatsoever to do with each other. A country that has credit standing, can 
borrow in the rest of the world, and if they do that, that's perfectly alright, and that 
doesn't threaten inflation or the central bank. And if they can't borrow abroad, then 
they can't borrow abroad. As long as it's clear that the central bank isn't printing the 
money, then the deficits will go away. Deficits that cannot be financed typically don't 
exist. They exist in Russia and I call wage arrears, and that, of course, isn't a good 
arrangement, but anywhere else, it's an unnecessary discussion. In the Brazilian context, 
to stay with the example, most of the deficit is the counterpart of the huge real interest 
rates. So, if they go away, then the fiscal problem substantially has gone away and comes 
down to a size that is easily financed in the world capital market, or in the domestic 
capital market, with extra support from more privatisations. It's just a non-issue. So, I 
want to emphasise how solving the interest rate problem in this particular case really 
solves the fiscal problem. And we don't have to have a separate discussion of it. 
 
In other countries, the currency board would also have been a good idea. Surely in 
Russia, if the IMF in its first programme as opposed to the second - they never got the 
money - had insisted on a currency board and had used the IMF money as support for a 
currency board rather than to pay off foreign loans, Russia would not be today where it 
is. The IMF didn't have the courage to do it, they said, "It's a big step, it's the last 
bullet". The argument, "It's the last bullet", is really a very, very bad argument if the 
war has long been lost before you get to use it. At some point, you have to have a bit of 
courage and understand that unless you do the regime change, you don't get a chance 
anymore. And in Russia, that was clearly the case. 
 
I think it's a little bit more difficult to make the argument that in Indonesia, the IMF 
should have supported a currency board. Indonesia got very, very excited in the midst of 
a tight IMF programme, with the idea that, if they had a currency board, then all their 
problems would be solved, because interest rates would be immediately down, and the  43
currency would be hard and the devaluation would never have happened because they 
could have it at a very, very high exchange rate. And all the world's money would come, 
and maybe they would be doing better than even before. And that argument was used to 
get from the IMF a few billion dollars for the currency board, and the IMF said, "No 
way", because the whole ploy is for Suharto’s children to steal the IMF money. And I 
think that is substantially true. So, I make a big distinction between the Russian case, 
where it was decisive to bring a change in the economic regime, and for everybody to see 
that, and where the economy was totally dollarised, so that a currency board really had 
in people's pockets already its equivalent. And Indonesia, where, I think, it was a ploy to 
steal money, and I return to Indonesia in that context.  
 
Brazil is for me the favourite example because I look at an economy that has a terrible 
track record from its own macroeconomics. I look at a neighbour that had the same 
experience, went for the cure and has done spectacularly with it. I look at an on-going 
problem in Brazil, even if they don't have an immediate collapse or a collapse soon, 
when macroeconomics will continue to be the difficult discussion. But I have to address 
the question of how a country with an overvalued currency, as I claim, could possibly 
now proceed to have a currency board at that overvalued currency. Isn't that a really 
terrible way of going about it?  
 
Of course, one argument is, have the famous last devaluation and then do it. And that, of 
course, means that even as you create a new world, you kick people in the face just once 
more for good memory. It, of course, would help to give you momentary gain on 
competitiveness, and in that way, make the currency board more credible, but it also 
would put in place inflationary forces which then, very soon, would become a question 
for the new currency board. I think it draws attention to an essential complement for a 
currency board - and that is a very competitive economy, where you have substantial 
ability of wages and prices to go down if that is necessary. So I believe it has a need for 
doing more than just fix the exchange rate. There is a need for the government to get out 
of wage policy, and for the government to accept that wages and prices may actually 
have to fall.  
 
Is that possible? The answer is, "Yes": in Argentina it's happening every day. In 
Argentina, in large firms, you have had major wage cuts: 10, 15, 20 per cent across the 
board for all. In Argentina, you do have deflation even in a situation of seven per cent 
growth. It's totally wrong to believe that in countries that have large monetary 
instability, there is no flexibility on the downside once the decisive regime change has 
occurred. But if you have pervasive government arrangements in the wage area, and if 
the government does not complement in the wage area or allow a market to do it, a 
currency board, then, of course, there is a conflict set up right from the beginning, that 
is inauspicious. So, a very competitive economy is the natural counterpart of a hard 
money so that the price system can still do its work.  
 
I will now come next to the second pillar of a better, and a more preventive system and 
that is a much easier one, and that is a good banking system. A good banking system 
substantially means bank regulation, bank supervision, bank capitalisation. And 
everybody knows what a bad balance sheet is. A bad balance sheet has lots of real estate, 
lots of equity, lots of foreign exchange, and lots of loans to the owners of the bank, their 
close relatives and the others who already have emigrated.  
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So, I don't want to say more about bad banks, but it rises essentially in the context of a 
hard money to say, "We can't afford a hard money because we have bad banks". That is 
the wrong way of arguing. If you have bad banks then you very urgently want to clean 
up your banks because bad banks go only one way: they get worse. In the end every 
bank is a fiscal problem. When you have bad banks it is in a political environment 
where it is totally understood that the government is going to bail them out in the end 
and that’s why they are so bad and that’s why the get worse. So cleaning up the banks is 
an essential counterpart of any attempt to have a well functioning economy. It is a 
counterpart of any attempt to have a dull, uninteresting macroeconomy. And there is no 
excuse to do it slowly because it is very expensive to postpone the cleanup. There is no 
technical issue in doing the cleanup. It’s mostly to decide to start to grow up and stop the 
mess. 
 
If you have a hard money and if you have clean banks then you don’t have 
macroeconomics as a problem anymore. Yes, you have slowdowns in the economy and 
yes you have booms and the key macro problem, the government, has been taken out of 
it. That’s very important to understand that in the economies we are talking about, the 
problem is the government. The government is not the solution. Hyperinflations are 
made by governments, debt defaults are made by governments, exchange rates crises are 
made by governments. And if they don’t know how to do it well, and the assumption is: 
no they do not know how to do it well, then take them out of the business. When that 
happens, spectacular results are the case. Hong Kong with its hard money even in the 
midst of a regional dramatic crisis, is there; their banks have not defaulted, yes, they 
have a recession, I’d have a recession too if my customers all disappeared. But, I think I 
wouldn’t default – and that is the case of Hong Kong and just in the same way 
Argentina – and hope for an early test. In Argentina that was 1995, and that was a 
recession year.  
 
And now Brazil comes and they say, “This time we won’t even have a recession. Our 
banks are even better, and we are even more competitive, and we don’t really expect 
that we will have negative numbers when it happens”. I think when a country moves 
from hyperinflation to that level of confidence in seven years and looks forward and 
says, “We can deal with problems”, it’s a fantastic transformation. And it’s an 
indictment of the arrangement they had before, and it’s a support for very, very 
substantial change in regime, which in the end isn’t costly, painful or expensive, but 
rather the best thing that someone can do to oneself. 
 
That of course is very important to highlight because the assumption is that when you 
do a currency board you are doing a cutting off your leg. You are doing something 
terrible to yourself and now it is agony and austerity. In fact it is the first day of a much, 
much better life, which will give you far better access to external credit, far lower 
interest rates and take the government out of business. 
 
I am disappointed that the IMF has not had the courage to be far, far more aggressive 
on the agenda of hard money and clean banks. It is totally obvious to anyone in the IMF, 
that the only problem is the governments. But, of course, since they only talk to those 
governments it is very hard to tell them, “Fritz you are the problem”. But they don’t 
have to say “Fritz you are the problem, or Hilda”, what they ought to do is flood the 
world with publications that show in large cross-sections that governments always are 
the problem. Nobody has any doubt in any class in monetary economics that inflation 
doesn’t come from heaven; that it is made by central banks. There is no question. And  45
why is that not allowed to enter the discussion in the same way that exchange rate crises, 
debt crises are made by a government, are essentially the political fall-out of bad 
economic policy.  
 
So the IMF, if it wants any claim to going in right direction, has to be far more 
aggressive in disarming countries and taking governments out of the business. In 
Argentina, the IMF has no claim whatsoever for having assisted in a currency board; 
the IMF was sceptical. In Russia the IMF had no support for a currency board and that 
is why it did not happen. And now we have a different Russia.  
 
Why is that so? I think that is a very, very important question in political economy. It is 
perhaps too cheap to say that they would lose their customers, but it is not totally remote 
as a proposition.  
 
Then we come from here to an entirely separate question. Once you are in a crisis, and it 
has happened and all the wisdom you may have heard before and discarded, and that 
has become irrelevant, how should you react? 
 
There is one idea: capital controls. Everybody wants their money out, the IMF is 
screaming that you raise your interest rate, George Soros is banging on you saying, “I 
want to bill you”, and your opposition is getting into the streets and the exchange rate is 
falling rapidly. The decisive step to take, and to have the courage to take, is capital 
controls. That is instinctive. If it moves, fix it; if they want their money back that is 
unfair because we can’t pay. The fact that we borrowed it overnight and they thought 
they could get it back is irrelevant now because it is so obvious that it is very costly. It’s 
immensely tempting to have capital control because the place would become very, very 
quiet the moment afterwards and the sheer relief of that quiet is the great promise. To 
let the exchange rate collapse, that isn’t an issue of quiet, because the more it collapses it 
is not true that the more competitive the currency and the more people will come in 
because it can only go up. It is really that if more public order breaks down the 
opposition gets a voice, the central banks starts printing, the defaults are left and right, 
the bankruptcies of all the people who lost on the dollar ruin employment; it’s the 
opening to a disaster.  
 
So, why not just be realistic and at the slightest sign of a crisis slap on capital controls 
and avoid altogether the meltdown. What is wrong with that? I think there is a big 
distinction between capital controls as part of the system in some form, and capital 
controls as means of spontaneous resort to the loss of control.  
 
But I think capital controls are the wrong answer. If a country has an extraordinary 
withdrawal of short-term credit and they made the mistake of having short-term credit 
positions, then they should have a debt restructuring. Then they should say, “We are 
now going to default on our debt and we are very, very sorry and what you thought was 
an overnight loan actually isn’t an overnight loan it is a long-term stabilisation loan. 
That makes an extraordinary important distinction between direct investment, which 
should be favoured at all times, and you should create a history of always treating direct 
investment extremely well, and short-term debt, which if thing go bad may turn out to 
be long-term debt. If that were done, then of course the foreign exchange problem would 
be solved.  
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I make that distinction between capital controls and debt re-negotiation or debt 
consolidation or debt restructuring - make it sound as favourable as you can - that 
solves the foreign exchange market problem. If it is done in that way, and 1982 is an 
example, then the one-way pressure in the foreign exchange market is gone overnight. It 
is not the end of the problem because a country may have to finance a current account 
deficit and therefore there is still adjustment to be done. There may even be a 
devaluation to be done, or the choice is not to do one, but at least it is not the free-for-all 
collapse. Governments are extremely reluctant to address the debt issue because on the 
other side the argument is, “Never, never even dream if it”. Official institutions support 
exactly that argument because they are terrified that Citibank should scream at them, 
which Citibank would do. But surely there is absolutely no reason in a Russia to have a 
wild collapse of the price system, the exchange rate and everything simply because 
people are unwilling to tell short-term foreign investors, “Fritz you have got to stay for a 
while”.  
 
The IMF should have in its first stabilisation programme, along with a currency board 
or to lengthen Russia’s debt, persuaded the investors to do just that. Exactly what they 
are trying to do now in Brazil, and had they done it the Russian problem would not have 
existed. Then, in time, the effort on the budget, which of course is totally essential and 
indispensable might well have happened; something that now is beyond belief. The debts 
that the IMF did not want to restructure now are simply defaulted with no prospect of 
getting paid in my lifetime. 
 
So, I make a distinction between capital controls, which is a switching off the radio, and 
a very structured debt re-negotiation which can be substantially differentiated, which 
can be agreeable, which banks when they know the choice is not to have a word in how 
it’s done or actually get a little bit of discussion of course is something that can happen, 
and it can even happen on a weekend.  
 
I think the IMF is surely responsible in Russia for the failure to have that and for the 
use of the stabilisation money for half the people to get out and the other half to be 
caught and that produced the currency collapse. The IMF argument is that if they had 
had a debt restructuring that would not have avoided a currency collapse. Well, I don’t 
know that for sure, what I do know is that we have had both. So, it is a risk well worth 
taking. 
 
I’ve talked about what the individual country should do and that leaves me with the 
question of having a better system. The very first question is whether exchange rate 
movements among major industrialised countries are a very systematic part of creating 
the crisis environment; that argument has been brought specifically in relation to the 
U.S. dollar.  
 
The U.S. dollar strengthened forever. Thailand was on the U.S. dollar. And because they 
pegged on the US dollar, they lost competitiveness day after day after day as the dollar 
was rising. That loss of competitiveness is what triggered the crisis. There is no question 
a germ of truth to that. It has a lot more to do with Thailand being on the dollar and 
allowing domestic wage inflation significantly above that in the United States, having a 
substantial fiscal expansion even as they experienced real appreciation, having a happy 
boom going on and doing all of that even as their export prices were falling. Yes, the 
dollar had a lot to do with it. But should we go from there to say it is totally essential 
that we fix the dollar-yen exchange rate so that a Thailand can then fix to the dollar and  47
not have a problem? I think that that reaches very far into the performance of the world 
economy and the costs of fixing exchange rates amongst major blocs of course are far, 
far more significant than what happened to Thailand, which mostly has to do with its 
mismanaged finance, and not with the dollar. 
 
The real appreciation that happened in Thailand is of the order of 5%. If you stretch it 
7%, and nobody dies from a 7% real appreciation. I mean that is a dose that you can 
give to children and they are alright. So, I dismiss both the dollar as the central player in 
the Thai story, I have argued it was their cutting the interest rate well below Singapore 
that did it, and I surely dismiss the notion that we need international monetary co-
ordination to make the periphery a safer place. The periphery has to work very, very 
hard on its own institutions so that it can get good economic performance in a world that 
is per force both volatile and suspect of the periphery.  
 
If that is better understood then the periphery will do well and in the meantime we can 
enjoy the volatility of major exchange rates. I think there is no prospect on earth that 
the U.S. dollar and the euro will be fixed, or will have narrow target zones. It’s well 
understood that that can only function by a culminated monetary policy. It is totally 
certain that the U.S. Congress and our Treasury and our Federal Reserve is totally 
unwilling to fix its destiny to Mr. Lafontaine. And it’s also clear that the European 
Central Bank is unwilling to fix its destiny to a Federal Reserve that may not forever be 
governed by Greenspan. I think that varies that topic entirely. 
 
Well I think that shifts your discussion more to two topics. One is the IMF, and should 
we re-arm the IMF and make them more able to conduct big battles; the large shoot-
outs with the hedge funds. And if we give them nuclear weapons and the other guys only 
have machine guns, then the good guys will win.  
 
The second question, whether we shouldn’t have, as a more systematic part of world 
finance, some form of nice capital controls, and the emphasis on nice, user-friendly, 
sweet. Let me address those two issues to complete my discussion.  
 
The IMF question I think is deeply misguided. The worst possible world is one where we 
have bailout without regulation, supervision and conditionality. A good world is where 
we have regulation, supervision, conditionality, and a lender of last resort. 
 
The IMF is unable, both from its demonstrated history, but also from the way it is 
governed by member countries, to effectively regulate, to supervise and to have 
conditionality. Take as an example Brazil. It has flaunted any advice from the IMF for 
the last eight years. The IMF has actively assisted them in the past year, to have another 
year of bad economic management. And it was ready with a big package to allow the 
president to get re-elected, and now is settling for a minimal programme which most 
definitely is not going to solve Brazil’s problem, even if it allows it to live with little 
growth for the next three or four years. So re-arming the IMF I think is a very frivolous 
idea. It promises to get us more and more the belief that wherever you see high interest 
rates, make the loans, because someone will come and bail you out in time. 
 
Is the bail-out happening because governments want the international community all at 
large, and at arms length to bail out their banks rather than have they themselves the 
costs visibly in their budgets? I think that has a lot to do with it. Japan’s enthusiasm for 
bail-outs in Asia have a lot to do with the Japanese banks that have made the loans and  48
surely the same is true when the U.S. is very enthusiastic about bailing out Brazil or 
Mexico.  
 
But we have to understand that that is to share internationally the costs rather than 
having in the budget, and to share the costs rather than being insistent that very 
important changes happen in economic management. It surely is the wrong system for 
the world economy and if governments like it that is one reason to be suspicious.  
 
So I have no sympathy for stocking up the IMF to give them money, so that wherever 
the world’s problems happen they are there to respond. I once wrote - and Stan Fischer 
was very generous to me, took great stress from it - that the IMF now functions on the 
system 1-800-BAILOUT. To be responsible I called that number and it is actually the 
West Texas Bail-Bond Association. So I thought maybe that was the wrong number so I 
tried “1-800 IMF-STAN” and that’s a French lingerie shop. So I don’t know what the 
number is but I have written this and a former student in Brazil said, “I really like your 
idea because you could have 1-800BAILOUT and then you get prompted: one for 
sovereign defaults, two for commercial debt, three to talk to our specialists. We have to 
understand that the system has allowed itself to be pushed to a position that is deeply 
counterproductive, where the effort at reform is small because the lending countries are 
too eager to put their money on the table to give you another year of peace. 
 
The more important question is the one of some form of capital controls as part of the 
system. The argument is: there is too much liquidity around and there is too much short 
notice demand for money, and people suddenly want to leave and an economy cannot 
leave. That is a problem if you don’t like bailouts, then you have administratively to 
minimise that situation. I have argued in my lecture two days ago that the way to 
address that problem is a national balance sheet that is not so liquid, and that happens 
automatically in a world where the banking system is well supervised and that that is the 
effective way to address that issue. 
 
But it is important to take seriously the proposition of Jim Tobin of years ago that there 
is excess trading; a proposition that actually goes back to Keynes who said that the great 
problem of America, is that people are traders and not investors and that therefore the 
place is a casino. The way to do it is to have transactions tax and that idea of Keynes, 
Tobin took very seriously in the sixties, to say: “Put some sand in the wheels, something 
that slows down the traffic”. Transactions tax a very, very small transactions tax which 
makes it unattractive to have daytime roundtrips but does not interfere with medium-
term investment. If it is a small tax, then on a daytime roundtrip it takes away most of 
the returns you could expect from a day trip, but advertised on a year it is insignificant 
and on five years you don’t even pay attention to it.  
 
The Tobin Tax is an extremely attractive proposition in a world where trading 
predominates, and capital gains mentality predominates, and a belief in liquidity 
predominates, which when exercised turns out not to be right, and creates market 
problems. It is speed limits. Speed limits are totally wonderful and create a safer 
environment. They create a safer environment because they take the few people who are 
risk to everybody else and do not internalise it by limiting the damage they can do. A 
Tobin Tax is like gun control. Gun control is wonderful because if the other guys don’t 
have guns either nor do I need them; I safely can be a long-term investor.  
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So a have great, great sympathy for a Tobin Tax but I think it is utterly irrelevant in the 
context of currency crises, because that very, very small Tobin Tax is utterly 
uninteresting when I look at a 30% devaluation within the next half year. Then, I want 
to get my money out. It slows down the overnight traffic it does not keep money in a 
place where it shouldn’t be. So, any belief that a Tobin Tax fits into the discussion of 
currency crisis, of Asia – a Tobin Tax works when people say, “You know the next few 
days are not really good and I am leaving for a moment before quickly coming back”. 
Those people would be kept in by a Tobin tax. But anyone who believes that, “This ship 
is going to sink and I am leaving, and sure I might come back but only after a large 
correction in asset prices”, that isn’t stopped. So, I think it is a disservice to Tobin to 
bring him into this discussion as a solution. It’s a way to try to make a very dirty 
argument look respectable, it has nothing to do with currency crises. It is a wonderful 
proposition to make the New York Stock Market look two days ahead rather than just 
to the afternoon and the next morning. 
 
A more dramatic proposal is that you should slow down the money on the way in. Not on 
the way out, but don’t let it come in the first place or control the terms on which it 
arrives. If that is done, Chilean style, then of course it is less liquid, and if it is less liquid 
then you are back to more nearly slow motion crisis, and if you are in slow motion crisis 
then of course all the room is there to make the corrective movements rather than to 
have a meltdown.  
 
The only problem with the citation of the Chilean experience is that the Chileans are 
very vigorous to say, “That isn’t how it works and it really hasn’t worked”. The 
experience with what is told as the Chilean story of nice taxes that slowed down in Chile 
the inflow of capital, and allowed them to have higher real interest rates than they had 
before, was mostly an administrative interference that mostly worked because the 
Chileans are very, very sweet people, and Chile is a village.  
 
Anyone who believes that in Indonesia Suharto’s family would have been slowed down 
for an epsilon of a second by the presence of Chilean style controls – well it’s a 
contradiction in terms - Indonesia is not Chile. In Thailand where corruption stank to 
heaven, surely nobody would have paid attention to the central bank saying, “You must 
not do this”. They would have said, “How much?” So the notion that in Asia or indeed 
in Latin America outside Chile, capital controls have any effectiveness is just a joke. 
 
On the way in it’s a joke and on the way out it would surely be the big occasion for 
corruption. Who doubts that the last billion in the central bank in Indonesia would have 
belonged to Suharto’s family? They would have got it and then the currency collapse 
would have happened. We have instances of that that are totally obvious including 
Thailand, where for a brief moment the currency appreciated very, very substantially 
and then there was a two billion dollar transaction and then the currency collapse 
began. Guess how that happened.  
 
So, I am deeply suspicious of capital controls as a way of running the system and I draw 
attention to the importance of free capital movements in getting an effective allocation of 
resources. All the arguments that are appropriate in trade theory, that tariffs, quotas 
and the like distort the efficient allocation of capital and labour in the economy are as 
appropriate for capital flows; there is absolutely no distinction. But I would add an 
important dimension for capital flows. To have an integrated capital market along with 
the world economy gives you corporate governance, which is a very, very important  50
reason for a well functioning economy. If you have capital controls, then you are 
essentially switching that off and you’re putting the government in place of what 
otherwise would have been a market economy. You have to look at the experience with 
decades of relatively free capital flows and count their benefits, and not go overboard 
when there is a financial crisis that mostly has to do with bad supervision and bad 
regulation, a bad environment rather than with capital flows per se.  
 
I’d look, and I conclude with that, at the Asian crisis as a wonderful opportunity to 
create better institutions and everything that we have seen in those events points at that 
as the lesson, and I’m shocked at the sympathy for capital flows in my profession, from 
people who don’t know the answer and people who should know better. I am shocked by 
the tendency of the IMF, not to discard that as a possibility, simply because they are 
unwilling to assert that it was sleazy governments and bad balance sheets that are the 
reason, including the IMF’s acknowledgement of it for years before. So I think one has 
to make a hard stand. A crisis offers the temptation to jump at the wrong answers really 
fast and it is also a temptation to assert what is right, what’s true and what’s good and 
to try and force that on the system. 
 
Thank you very much! 
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